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THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS:
EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE BURGER COURT
ALBERT BRODERICK*
This issue memorializes the contributions of the Warren Court to the
jurisprudence of equal protection. My task is to appraise developments
since the appointments of Chief Justice Burger in 1969 and of Justice
Blackmun in 1970-the beginnings of what has been inevitably identi-
fied as the Burger Court.
Such an appraisal requires a review of the leading equal protection
decisions of the Burger Court (Part I), and placement of its individual
Justices (Part II). It also invites a glance to the Court's immediate fu-
ture (Part III). Once such predictions are attempted a new and larger
question emerges: What is the currently accepted process of constitu-
tional decision-making? (Part IV). Finally, what criteria are available
for subjecting this process and its products to fair criticism? (Part V).
The Burger Court's equal protection decisions furnish an interesting
launching pad for these more general inquiries. The Burger Court's1
decade of effort has been characterized by a surprisingly mild applica-
tion of brakes to some thrusts of its predecessor, by some controversial
answers to difficult questions that the Warren Court had not directly
addressed,' and by an internal fragmentation on some critical issues.
The Burger Court has operated in a public atmosphere considerably
less congenial to civil rights than that of the 1960's, and some may ap-
praise its record with that in mind. Others may choose to emphasize
that the leadership of Chief Justice Warren and his Court from the
mid-1950's helped spark the Civil Rights Revolution of the mid-1960's,
and that no comparable leadership may be claimed for the contempo-
rary Burger Court. Its decisions relating to equal protection will be
considered under six headings: Racial Segregation in Public Schools,
* A.B. 1937, Princeton University; LL.B. 1941, S.J.D. 1963, Harvard University; D. Phil.
1968, Oxford University; Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University.
1. Of those who sat on the Warren Court, four Justices remained until Justice Stewart's
resignation at the end of the 1980 Term: Brennan, White, Marshall and Stewart. Three other
Justices later joined those just named: Justices Powell and Rehnquist in 1972, and Justice Stevens
in 1975. On September 21, 1981 Justice Sandra D. O'Connor was confirmed by the Senate to fill
the Stewart vacancy. This article addresses the work of the Court through the 1980 Term.
2. Notably, affirmative action and the companion problem of de facto (non-state mandated)
public school desegregation, the interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
"finalization" of equal protection methodology.
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The "Purposeful" Discrimination Requirement- Washington v. Davis,'
Equal Protection Methodology, Sex Discrimination, The Enforcement
Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and Affirmative
Action. A review of the Burger Court's performance in these selected
categories may suggest to some that its work product in equal protec-
tion has been in some respects surprisingly good, and in others not as
restrictive as might have been expected given the uncongenial national
atmosphere.
I. THE DECISIONS (1970-1981)
A. Racial Segregation in Public Schools
For a time in the course of the decade, it seemed that the Burger
Court was on the verge of calling a halt to the proudest undertaking of
the Warren Court-its program for eliminating the dual system of ra-
cial schools that was the product of the Supreme Court's "separate but
equal" aberration from 1896-1954.4 But no such conclusion can fairly
be reached today.-
The Warren Court's desegregation agenda evolved slowly after the
watershed decision in Brown v. Board of Education5 (Brown I) in 1954
decreed that segregation in public education was inherently unequal.
In the following year the Court ruled in Brown JJ6 that the lower fed-
eral courts should use their equitable powers to supervise the desegre-
gation of offending school districts "with all deliberate speed." The
Court's insistence upon the total elimination of a dual system became
explicit in 1968, when in Green v. County School Board' it unanimously
held that public school boards were "clearly charged with the affirma-
tive duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a uni-
tary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch."8 The Warren Court was concerned only with segregation
compelled by state law, de jure segregation; it never faced up to the
largely northern question of schools that were in fact racially segre-
gated but without overt state compulsion, de facto segregation.9
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for a unanimous Court in Swann v.
3. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
4. From Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), racial segregation was maintained in public schools by virtue of Plessy's "separate but
equal" interpretation of the equal protection clause.
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
7. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
8. Id at 437-38.
9. "[T]he differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called defacto segrega-
tion. . . ispurpose or intent to segregate." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
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Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education'" in 1971 reaffirmed the
Green resolve, and for the first time the Court upheld a court-man-
dated busing remedy as "one tool of school desegregation." I In Keyes
v. School District No. 1 2 in 1973 the Court addressed for the first time
alleged racial discrimination in a northern school system which had no
background of state-legislated segregation. Although the Court refused
to find that de facto segregation constituted a constitutional violation,
as such, it held that a showing of intentional segregation in one part of
a school district created a rebuttable presumption that the entire school
district was unconstitutionally segregated. 3 This was a significant for-
ward step. However, in a series of school cases after Keyes, the force of
Brown II and Green seemed to have been spent. In Milliken v. Brad-
ley 4 in 1974 the Court refused to uphold a lower court order directing
an interdistrict remedy combining de jure segregated schools of Detroit
with adjacent suburban ones in which no purposeful segregation had
been found. The desegregation movement lost further momentum in
cases handed down in 1976"
5 and 1977.16
However, a pair of cases decided by the Court in 1979, Columbus
Board of Education v. Penick 7 and Dayton Board of Education v. Brink-
man'8 (Dayton II), may prove to be the most sweeping post-Brown
victories won by desegregation forces. While adhering to the Court's
previous position that only purposeful (de jure) segregation constituted
the constitutional violation that would justify race-conscious remedies,
the Court determined that a finding of purposeful segregation as of
1955 (when Brown I was decided) in a significant part of a school
district created a presumption that the segregative purpose continued,
unless effectively rebutted by school board officials.' 9 With Columbus
and Dayton II the Burger Court gave desegregation forces an effective
litigating tool, although not equalizing the loss of interdistrict remedies
which Milliken had denied them.
10. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
1i. Id at 30.
12. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
13. Id at 201.
14. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
15. In Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), the Supreme Court in an
opinion by Justice Rehnquist reversed, as an abuse of discretion, a lower court's remedies for
desegregation.
16. In Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) the Court held that the evi-
dence as to constitutional violations was not sufficient to justify the systemwide busing remedy
decreed by the district court. But see text accompanying notes 17-19 infra.
17. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
18. 443 U.S. 526 (1976).
19. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458, 467 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979).
3
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B. The "Purposeful" Discrimination Requirement-
Washington v. Davis
A suit challenging on racial grounds the recruiting practices of the
Washington Metropolitan Police Department produced the most re-
strictive decision of the Burger Court in the equal protection field. In
Washington v. Davis2" the Court held that to establish constitutional
violation of equal protection plaintiffs must prove that the challenged
governmental action was intentional, purposeful discrimination. In
Davis both the lower courts and the extensive briefs in the Supreme
Court had assumed that a showing of "discriminatory impact" was suf-
ficient to put the burden of justification upon the governmental parties,
as the Court had ruled with respect to employment discrimination Suits
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21 The Washington v.
Davis decision distinguished the Title VII cases,"2 and the Court
promptly reaffirmed its Davis position in a series of equal protection
cases concerning both racial23 and sexual discrimination.24
Although the Washington v. Davis line of cases left open the possibil-
ity that the required discriminatory purpose might be inferred from a
sufficiently gross pattern of discriminatory effects, there has been
neither fruitful nor consistent suggestion from the Court as to what evi-
dence is required to permit this inference of "purpose."25 The Court
found such a predicate for purposeful inference in the school desegre-
gation setting in the Columbus and Dayton 11 cases.26 But in City of
Mobile v. Bolden27 in 1980 a divided Court declined to find such an
inference justified in a racial voting rights context. And in Bolden the
Court seems to have extended the Washington v. Davis "purposeful"
requirement to the fifteenth amendment.28
20. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
21. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1977), the Court held that discriminatory impact upon minorities of employment
requirements or practices was sufficient to constitute a violation of Title VII, absent a showing that
the practice had a "manifest relationship to the employment in question." 401 U.S. at 432.
22. In Washington v. Davis plaintiffs sought relief on two grounds: (1) A constitutional viola-
tion under the equal protection component of the fifth amendment; and (2) a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), which has been construed as inparimateria with Title VII. 426 U.S. at 233.
23. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
24. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
25. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Arlington Heights purported to establish criteria
for purposeful discrimination, but they have been erratically applied. The complaint of Judge
Goldberg of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Jones v. City of Lubbock, 640 F.2d 777,
777-79 (5th Cir. 1980) illustrates judicial frustration with the problem. See note 259 infra.
26. See notes 17 and 18 supra.
27. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
28. 446 U.S. at 63. Although Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court was a plurality opinion,
some courts of appeal have construed the several opinions as establishing a Supreme Court major-
ity on this point. See Jones v. City of Lubbock, 640 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1980).
4
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C. Equal Protection Methodology
In a rather unplanned way the Warren Court breathed life into the
equal protection clause which, prior to Brown J,29 had been "the usual
last resort of constitutional arguments,"3 and a usually ineffective one
at that. Aside from one out-of-line opinion of Justice Douglas in
1942," the Court usually tested challenges to statutes on eq1 ual protec-
tion grounds with a very deferential rational basis review.' 2 However,
building on a suggestion of Justice Black in Korematsu v. United
States33 and on an earlier dictum of Justice Stone ,34 the Warren Court
developed an equal protection doctrine that classifications based on
race were "suspect," requiring strict judicial scrutiny and the showing
of a "compelling state interest" in order to pass constitutional muster.35
Another series of cases stipulated similar "strict scrutiny" when certain
"fundamental rights" or "interests" were impinged upon by govern-
mental action.36 Thus the material for what would be called the two-
tier theory of equal protection review was already well in place at the
outset of the Burger Court.
1. The Two-Tier Theory and the Burger Court
A 1973 decision by the Burger Court gave the two-tier theory its first
formal approval. At the same time the Court curtailed the expansion
of both the "suspect classification" and "fundamental interest" catego-
ries. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,37 the
Court was asked to strike down a scheme of financing public schools
that was keyed to the economic wealth of individual school districts.
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court rejected plaintiffs argument that
such financing constituted a "suspect classification" because it was
based on the wealth, or the poverty, of individual school districts. 8
29. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. This was Justice Holmes' observation in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
31. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court subjected a state sterilization
statute to "strict scrutiny" because the legislation impinged on "one of the basic civil rights of
man." Id at 541.
32. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
33. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Justice Black's opinion for the Court first suggested that classifica-
tions based on race or nationality were "suspect." Id at 216.
34. In his influential footnote to United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), not
expressly directed to equal protection, Justice Stone suggested a variety of concerns which might
justify "more exacting scrutiny." Id at 152 n.4.
35. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
36. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968) (access to ballot); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (access of indigents to courts).
37. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
38. Id at 18-29.
5
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The 5-4 opinion also denied that education was a "fundamental right"
which would trigger the "compelling state interest" test.39 Since neither
"suspect class" nor "fundamental right" was in question, the "upper
tier," which entailed strict judicial scrutiny and the showing of "com-
pelling state interest," was not applicable. The Court then considered
the Texas statute under the deferential rational basis test, the "lower
tier," and found this standard satisfied.40
Since Rodriguez the Court has identified no other "fundamental
rights" for equal protection purposes.4' Nor has it added to the spare
list of "suspect classifications. 42 There has been, as we shall see,43 a
partial breakdown of the two-tier theory. Sex or gender based classifi-
cations now seem to be treated by the Court in a category of their own,
intermediate to the "compelling state interest" and "rational basis"
tiers." And, less explicitly, classifications based on illegitimacy have
also been made a special case.45
The message of Rodriguez had been that what was not in the "upper
tier" must necessarily be treated by the deferential rational basis
formula.46 For a time, some opinions suggested that the Burger Court
would call for a more rigorous means-end inquiry under the rational
basis test than had the Warren Court, by requiring the legislature (state
or Congress) to "articulate" the governmental purpose which was to be
"rationally furthered by the legislation. '47 However, in closely divided
decisions in 1981, the Court reaffirmed the Warren Court notion of a
most deferential rational basis test, dropping the need to "articulate."
48
39. Id at 29-39.
40. Id at 40-44.
41. The "fundamental rights" or "fundamental interests" for equal protection purposes are
distinguished from other "fundamental rights" which the Court has identified as rooted in other
provisions of the Constitution. "The distinctive feature in most of the fundamental interests...
equal protection cases ...is that the justification for heightened scrutiny stems entirely from
equal protection itself, not from any independent source elsewhere in the Constitution." G. GUN-
THER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 908 (10th ed. 1980).
42. In an ill-starred sortie in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) the Burger Court
added alienage to race and nationality as a "suspect class" that requires "compelling state inter-
est" justification. The Court has since back-pedaled a good way from this decision. See Amback
v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
43. See text accompanying notes 76-78 infra.
44. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
45. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
46. 411 U.S. at 17.
47. Justice Powell had given careful consideration to this notion in Rodriguez. Id at 28.
48. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in United States R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166 (1980) marked this development: "Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Con-
gress' action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this
reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision,' because this Court has never insisted that a
legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute." Id at 461 (citations omitted). See
also Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074 (1981).
6
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2. The Two-Race or "Two-Class" Theory
The two-tier theory must not be confused with the two-race theory of
equal protection review which emanates from the Slaughter-House
Cases4 9 of 1873. Justice Powell later called it the "two-class" theory."
There was never any question but that the equal protection clause,
like the entire fourteenth amendment, was by its terms applicable to
"any person. ' ' "t However, in Slaughter-House, rejecting an equal pro-
tection argument against a state-imposed monopoly, Justice Miller
stated for the Court:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way
of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It
is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong
case would be necessary for its application to any other.
5 2
It is arguable whether overall the Warren Court had advanced or re-
tarded this two-race notion. True, many of its broadest applications of
equal protection, starting with the school cases, involved the rights of
black citizens.53 On the other hand, the Warren Court sponsored the
most extensive protection given to "any person," 54 as such, in the his-
tory of the equal protection clause: the far-reaching legislative reap-
portionment cases protecting the vote of "any person" from
"dilution" 55 and the special "fundamental rights" cases triggering strict
equal protection scrutiny, such as equal right to vote 56 and to have ac-
cess to the ballot as candidates in elections, 7 the right of access to
courts,5" and the right to travel free from burdensome residence re-
quirements.59 All these equal protection interests affected "any per-
son," not just the black citizen for whom Slaughter-House had noted a
special regard. In many cases the Warren Court did show that special
regard.' Yet often, in fostering the civil rights of black citizens, it re-
sorted to the thirteenth amendment (which is almost exclusively keyed
49. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
50. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 (1978).
51. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) the equal protection clause was cited as the
basis for reversing a conviction of Chinese aliens on grounds of discrimination "against a particu-
lar class of persons." Id at 373.
52. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81.
53. See text accompanying notes 5-9 supra; cases cited note 35 supra.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
55. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 230-31, 247 (1962).
56. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
57. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
58. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent entitled to counsel when first appeal
from criminal conviction is permitted by state law).
59. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
60. See text accompanying notes 5-9 supra; cases cited note 35 supra.
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to race)6' and to congressional power under the enforcement clause
(section 5) of the fourteenth amendment,62 rather than to the equal pro-
tection clause.
Some early cases of the Burger Court gave a broader scope to equal
protection in situations involving black citizens than in comparable sit-
uations where race was not a factor.63 But a vigorous, if not terminal,
blow was struck against the two-race theory by Justice Powell in his
crucial solo opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.' He acknowledged the Slaughter-House Cases as the source of
what he called a "two-class theory '  and conceded that "[tihe Court's
initial view of the Fourteenth Amendment was that its 'one pervading
purpose' was 'the freedom of the slave race.' ",66 He also conceded that
"[olver the past 30 years, this Court has embarked upon the crucial
mission of interpreting the Equal Protection Clause with the view of
assuring to all persons 'the protection of equal laws,' in a Nation con-
fronting a legacy of slavery and racial discrimination. '67  But Justice
Powell then simply swept aside the two-race theory as an anachronism:
"It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all
persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of
protection greater than that accorded others.' 68
In his Bakke concurrence, Justice Blackmun met Justice Powell's po-
sition head-on:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment has [not] broken away from its moorings
and its original intended purposes. Those original aims persist .... If
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
The crucial Warren Court decision here is Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
62. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
63. Compare White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) with Gaffley v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735
(1973). Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) put life into the moribund civil rights conspir-
acy statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c), with respect to conspiracies in which there was "some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' ac-
tion." 403 U.S. at 102. But Griin did not reach the constitutional equal protection question; it
was rested on the thirteenth amendment and the right to interstate travel. Conversely, the Burger
Court gave narrower scope to equal protection and to Congress' enforcement power under section
5 of the fourteenth amendment in situations that did not involve racial factors. Compare James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) with Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) and Oregon v. Mitch-
ell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
64. 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978).
65. Id at 295.
66. Id at 291.
67. Id at 293-94 (citation omitted).
68. Id at 295. Justice Powell suggested that even if the Slaughter-House position was still
tenable on historical grounds, it was difficult to put it in practical effect, or indeed to justify its
application, with respect to the new racial minorities. He opted for the "any person" approach.
Id at 295-99. See text accompanying notes 190-91 infra.
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this conflicts with idealistic equality, that tension is original Fourteenth
Amendment tension, constitutionally conceived and constitutionally
imposed, and it is part of the Amendment's very nature until complete
equality is achieved in the area.
69
In his 1980 opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 7 0 Justice Powell seemed
to soften the absoluteness of his Bakke position as he expressly recog-
nized the heavy responsibility of the Supreme Court itself for racial
discrimination in America:
Indeed, our own decisions played no small part in the tragic legacy of
government-sanctioned discrimination. See Plessy . . Dred
Scot. . . . At least since the decision in Brown . . . , the Court has
been resolute in its dedication to the principle that the Constitution en-
visions a Nation where race is irrelevant. The time cannot come too
soon when no governmental decision will be based upon immutable
characteristics of pigmentation or origin. But in our quest to achieve a
society free from racial classification, we cannot ignore the claims of
those who still suffer from the effects of identifiable discrimination.7'
The problem of the two-race theory, in the Slaughter-House sense,
does not seem to have been resolved by the Court. The solution is
concededly complicated by the presence on the current scene of other
disadvantaged minorities which were not envisaged as special benefi-
ciaries of equal protection at the time of the Civil War Amendments,
but whose claims to fair consideration obviously cannot be ignored.72
D. Sex Discrimination
Despite the inclusion of sex as a forbidden basis for discrimination
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 the Warren Court had marked sex
classifications for no special constitutional treatment. From its decision
in Reed v. Reed74 in 1971 the Burger Court clearly required more than
routine rational basis scrutiny where a constitutional equal protection
claim was based on alleged sex discrimination. The bid to recognize
sex as a "suspect class" failed for want of a single vote in Frontiero v.
69. 438 U.S. at 405.
70. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
71. Id at 516 (citations omitted).
72. This consideration clearly influenced Justice Powell in Bakke, although it did not prevent
his upholding a ten percent minority (identified as "citizens of the United States who are Negroes,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Eskimos and Aleuts") set-aside in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 517. On the
other hand, it continues to be a major barrier to Justice Stevens. See text accompanying notes
180-81 infra.
73. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 79 Stat. 255; Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 109 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2 (1976)). For example, § 2000e-2(a) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer--(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual. . . because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .
74. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
9
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Richardson75 in 1973. Finally, in 1976, the Court seemed to settle upon
a compromise-sex classifications were to be tested neither by the strict
scrutiny test, nor by the traditional rational basis test, but in a specially
constructed intermediate category all by itself.76 To justify a classifica-
tion on the basis of sex the state or federal government must show that
the use of sex as a classifier had a substantial relation to an important
governmental interest." This came to be known as the Craig v. Boren
test. It is applicable whether the gender classification is directly bur-
densome to women or benignly favorable to them as a compensation
for past discrimination.78
E. The Enforcement Clauses of the Fourteenth
and Fyleenth Amendments
A notable legacy of the Warren Court was its conclusion that Con-
gress had the power under the enforcement clauses of the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments to ban conduct that would not have violated
the specific provisions of section 1 of those amendments. In two 1966
cases interpreting the Voting Rights Act of 1965, South Carolina v. Kat-
zenbach79 and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 0 the Court gave the enforce-
ment clauses a broad scope that had been denied them since the
restrictive Civil Rights Cases"' of 1883. Katzenbach v. Morgan
presented the question whether congressional legislation to outlaw state
literacy tests with respect to New York City's Puerto Rican community
was constitutional.8 2 The Court held that the only limitation on the
congressional "enforcement" power was that the legislation be "appro-
priate" within the broad sense of McCulloch v. Maryland.8 3 This en-
tailed only three inquiries: (1) whether the statute "may be regarded as
an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause"; (2) "whether it
is 'plainly adapted to that end' "; and (3) "whether it is not prohibited
but is consistent with 'the letter and spirit of the constitution.' "84 In his
opinion in Morgan for a 7-2 Court Justice Brennan upheld the congres-
75. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
76. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
77. "[C]lassification by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id
78. Craig v. Boren was itself a "benign discrimination" case. The applicability of the stan-
dard to both invidious and benign discrimination was made clear in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279
(1979) and Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980).
79. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). In South Carolina v. Katzenbach the Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the various provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as an "appropriate" exercise of
congressional power under section 2 of the fifteenth amendment. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
80. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
81. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
82. 384 U.S. at 643-44.
83. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
84. 384 U.S. at 651.
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sional act on two distinct grounds. First, the legislation was a remedy
enforcing a constitutional right already recognized by the Court: en-
hancing the voting power of large segments of the Puerto Rican com-
munity would be instrumental in their "gaining nondiscriminatory
treatment in public services."85 There seemed to be no problem here.
But Justice Brennan offered a second basis for upholding the legisla-
tion. Congress could appropriately determine that outlawing literacy
tests would foster "the elimination of an invidious discrimination in
establishing voter qualifications." 86  Here there was a difficulty. In a
1959 case' (which the Court declined to overrule in either South Caro-
lina88 or Morgan),89 the Court had refused to strike down state literacy
tests for voting as per se unconstitutional. Thus, the second ground of
the Brennan opinion seemed to recognize Congress' power under the
enforcement clauses to give its own expanded version of the content of
equal protection even in the face of a contrary prevailing opinion by
the Court. 90 This second (substantive) ground for Morgan came under
heavy attack in the literature.9 It has never been rejected by the
Supreme Court.92 But in two cases, 10 years apart, the Burger Court
may have confined this congressional "enforcement" power to "reme-
dial" legislation, rather than extending it to "substantive" legislation
which would reinterpret the content of equal protection rights.
In Oregon v. Mitchell9 3 in 1970 the Court unanimously upheld con-
gressional legislation that extended the ban on literacy tests nation-
wide. However, a sharply-divided Court rejected Congress' purported
determination on the second (substantive) Katzenbach v. Morgan the-
85. Id at 652.
86. Id at 653-56.
87. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). In Lassiter a unan-
imous Court rejected a black citizen's equal protection challenge to a North Carolina literacy test.
88. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
89. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
90. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented:
In view of. . . Lassiter, I do not think it is open to Congress to limit the effect of that decision
as it has undertaken to do by § 4(e). In effect the Court reads § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as giving Congress the power to define the substantive scope of the Amendment. If that
indeed be the true reach of § 5, then I do not see why Congress should not be able as well to
exercise its § 5 "discretion" by enacting statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and
due process decisions of this Court.
384 U.S. at 668. Justice Brennan rejected this suggestion in his opinion for the Court: "[Section] 5
grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees [which the Court had
identified in the fourteenth amendment by its decisions]." 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
91. Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 603 (1974-75); Burt, Miranda and Title II. A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81.
92. Justice Rehnquist vigorously contended in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,
206 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) that the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), continue to
stand for the proposition that Congress' power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment is
"remedial" only. 446 U.S. at 220.
93. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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ory as under section 5 that the states' denial of voting to 18-year-olds
infringed equal protection. The literacy test enactment was upheld as
remedial. But the 18-year-old vote, according to five Justices, was sub-
stantive legislation beyond the congressional enforcement power.94 In
City of Rome v. United States95 in 1980, the Court again faced the ques-
tion of the scope of congressional power to enforce the equal protection
clause. A provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prevented munici-
palities in states covered by the Act from making changes in their elec-
toral system without approval by either the Attorney General or a
federal district court. The city of Rome sought to change from district
to at-large voting, and apparently convinced the district court that it
had not been guilty of purposeful (i.e., unconstitutional) discrimination
against black voters for almost twenty years. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court found in South Carolina,96 Morgan,9 and Mitchell98
(as to literacy tests) ample basis to deny Rome's requested change:
"[E]ven if § 1 of the [15th] Amendment prohibits only purposeful dis-
crimination . . . Congress may . . . pursuant to § 2, outlaw voting
practices that are discriminatory in effect." 99 Rome was expressly a
fifteenth amendment case. However, the Court made clear that the
same "appropriate" standard of McCulloch v. Maryland would be ap-
plicable under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment."° The Court
viewed the congressional statute in question in Rome as "remedial"
and not "substantive."' 1 The present viability of Justice Brennan's
second (substantive) ground in Morgan is dubious, but in view of the




With the still unfinished business of affirmative action, sometimes
loosely referred to as "benign discrimination," the Burger Court has
faced up to hotly controversial social issues that the Warren Court had
not addressed. 03 As we have seen, the Court has consistently refused
94. Id at 118, 129.
95. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
96. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
97. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
98. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
99. 446 U.S. at 173.
100. Id at 176-77.
101. Id at 182.
102. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 41, at 1097. But the legislation presently under considera-
tion in Congress to define when life begins for purpose of abortion (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)) would, if passed, bring again before the Court the extent of Congress' "substantive" power
under section five of the fourteenth amendment. See text accompanying notes 410-16 infra.
103. See note 2 supra.
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to view sex as a "suspect classification.' Decisions dealing with sex
discrimination, including the "benign" (affirmative action) variety,
evolved an intermediate constitutional test that was neither "strict scru-
tiny" nor "rational basis."' 5 However, when affirmative action cases
dealing with race, which is a "suspect classification,' °0 reached the
Court, the argument was made that any use of race to benefit, as well as
to disadvantage, a "discrete and insular"'0 7 minority constituted the
"suspect classification" which triggered the exacting "strict scrutiny-
compelling state interest" test. If such "benign" use of race was indeed
"suspect," the question to be litigated was simply whether the state
could show justifying reasons that were "compelling." If the "benign"
use of race was not "suspect" where it only incidentally disadvantaged
non-minority persons, little difficulty was anticipated in the state's
showing a rational basis for the classifications.0 8 The question
whether benign use of race was "suspect" first came to the Court in
cases challenging the preferential minority admissions programs that
state universities had used to bring about increased minority participa-
tion in professional schools, DeFunis v. Odegaardt°9 and Regents of the
University of Calfornia v. Bakke."' The Court avoided decision on
this difficult and controversial problem in DeFunis, ruling DeFunis'
suit "moot" because he had been provisionally admitted to the Univer-
sity of Washington Law School after commencement of his legal action
and would graduate whatever the outcome."'I The problem would not
go away, and in 1977 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
the California Supreme Court's determination that Alan Bakke, a
white student disadvantaged by a preferential admissions program,
should be admitted to the state medical school at Davis, and that Cali-
104. See text accompanying notes 73-78 supra.
105. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The test was most recently reformulated in
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980): "[G]ender-based discriminations must
serve important governmental objectives and ...the discriminatory means employed must be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Id at 150.
106. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
107. This phrase is from Justice Stone's footnote in United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See note 34supra. It had also been accepted as a measure of a "suspect
classification" by Justice Powell in his opinion for the Court in San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). See text accompanying notes 37-46 supra.
The counter argument, of course, is that the whole point of the "suspect classification" was to
protect or compensate the "discrete and insular" minority. This was the very center of the dispute
before the Court in both DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) and Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), which are discussed immediately below.
108. The premise here is the two-tier theory of Rodriguez, 411 U.S. i (1973). See text accom-
panying notes 37-46 supra.
109. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
110. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
111. 416 U.S. at 319-20.
13
Broderick: The Nature of the Constitutional Process: Equal Protection and th
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1981
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS
fornia could not use race as a criterion for admissions." 2
The Court's 5-4 decision in Bakke yielded the narrowest possible
agreement on two conclusions: (1) Bakke should be admitted in light
of the illegality of the Medical School's preferential admissions pro-
gram which reserved sixteen of a hundred seats for minority applicants;
and (2) use of race as a factor in admissions was not per se unconstitu-
tional." 13 But there was no agreement within the Court as to the basis
for its decision, or as to the proper constitutional formula for adjudicat-
ing the constitutionality of affirmative action." 4 Only five members of
the Court reached the constitutional question at all-Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun (the Brennan Four), for whom the Da-
vis program survived the equal protection challenge, and Justice Powell
for whom it did not." 5 Powell's vote added to those of Justices Ste-
vens, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger (the Stevens Four),
who found the Davis program in violation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,' 16 insured Bakke's admission and the invalidation
of Davis' admissions program." 7 However, Justice Powell, after find-
ing "suspect classification" the appropriate category to test the constitu-
tional claim of a "majority" plaintiff, recognized that securing a diverse
student body might be a "compelling state interest" that would justify
using race as one among several criteria for admissions." 8 He also
seemed to suggest that appropriate "findings" by the legislature, courts,
or administrative bodies that an affirmative action program would rem-
edy the effects of past discrimination could justify a less strident use of
race than the sixteen-seat set-aside in Bakke."' The doctrinal confu-
sion left by the Court in Bakke was compounded by the fact that the
112. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152 (1976), cert. granted,
429 U.S. 1090 (1977), at'dinpart and rev'd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
113. 438 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1978).
114. Justice Powell ruled that any use of race constituted a "suspect classification" requiring
that "a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and sub-
stantial" and "'necessary . . . to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its
interest." Id at 305. Justice Powell used the words "substantial" and "compelling" interchangea-
bly. Id at 309, 314. By insisting upon the showing of "necessity" he invoked a most stringent
version of the "compelling state interest" test. See text accompanying notes 37-46 supra. The
Brennan Four categorically rejected this view, and proffered a constitutional test never before
used in the racial context. 438 U.S. at 369-74. See text accompanying note 123 infra.
115. Although Justice Powell found the Davis program unconstitutional, he declined to up-
hold the California courts' "enjoining petitioner from according any consideration to race in its
admissions process." 438 U.S. at 272. To Powell, "the State has a substantial interest that legiti-
mately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive con-
sideration of race and ethnic origin." Id at 320. According to Justice Powell, considering race as
one among several factors in determining admissions was a far cry from a specific set-aside of
sixteen out of a hundred seats on grounds of race alone. Id at 315.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
117. 438 U.S. at 271.
118. Id at 315.
119. Id
14
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only Justices besides Powell who addressed the constitutional issue
identified neither the "strict scrutiny-compelling state interest" test, nor
the "rational basis" test as applicable. 20 Instead the Brennan Four,
who would have upheld the Davis program, said that the "intermedi-
ate" Craig v. Boren test' 2 ' requiring a "substantial relation to an impor-
tant state interest"'' 22 was the measure of the constitutionality of
affirmative action as to race as well as sex.' 23 Subsequent courts, both
state and federal, called upon to deal with the constitutional dimen-
sions of Bakke must discern whether a challenged program survives
both the Powell and the Brennan Four tests.'
24
Since Bakke two other affirmative action cases--each dealing with
congressional legislation-have somewhat sharpened the contours of
the Burger Court's stance on affirmative action. The first of these cases,
United Steelworkers v. Weber' 25 involved a "voluntary" private affirm-
ative action craft training program in a contract between a labor union
and an employer, with equal places reserved for blacks and whites.
The Court did not consider it as a constitutional case; the most pressing
question in Weber was whether such a voluntary program was made
illegal by the express terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 126 Holding
that it was not, a 5-2 Court (Justices Powell and Stevens not sitting)
emphasized the overriding policy of the Civil Rights Act:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those
who had "been excluded from the American dream for so long," consti-
tuted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-
conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segrega-
tion .... 27
However, the Court recognized that there was a "line of demarcation
between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans."'12
The plan in Weber survived because it did not "unnecessarily trammel
the interests of white employees,"' 29 because it was temporary, 3 0 and
because it was "designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in
120. See note 114 supra.
121. See text accompanying notes 73-78 supra.
122. Their proposal would constitute a further deviation from the rigid two-tier theory of San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See text accompanying notes
37-46 upra.
123. 438 U.S. at 359.
124. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305-06, 359-62 (1978). E.g., DeR-
onde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 172 Cal. Rptr. 677, 625 P.2d 220 (1981).
125. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
126. Id
127. Id at 204 (citations omitted).
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traditionally segregated job categories."''
The second post-Bakke affirmative action case, Ful/ilove v. Kutz-
nick, 32 sheds a bit more light on the equal protection obstacle to af-
firmative action. But the 6-3 majority upholding a federal affirmative
action program did not tip its hand as between the Bakke approaches
of the Brennan Four and Powell. The challenge in Ful/ilove was to a
congressionally enacted program which "set aside" up to 10% of the
$4,200,000,000 appropriation of the Public Works Employment Act of
1977133 for "minority business enterprises" (MBE). Justices Marshall,
Brennan, and Blackmun rested their approving votes on the ground
that the program passed the affirmative action test they had identified
in Bakke ("substantial relation to an important governmental interest,"
the Craig v. Boren test). 134 However, the other three approving Jus-
tices, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White and Powell marked out
still another approach which constitutes Fullilove's special contribution
to the Court's developing "line of demarcation" for "permissible" af-
firmative action.
35
Chief Justice Burger's Fullilove opinion merits detailed study be-
cause it furnishes necessary information as to the basis upon which
three members of a six-Justice majority of the Court upheld an affirma-
tive action program in which "Congress for the first time in the Na-
tion's history has created a broad legislative classification for
entitlement to benefits based solely on racial characteristics."' 36 If the
Bakke tests are still relevant, then why the special interest in the Bur-
ger opinion in Fullilove? The interest lies in the opinion's stress that the
affirmative action program under consideration -as the product of the
exercise of congressional power, especially under the enforcement
clause of the fourteenth amendment, upon renewed recognition that
such congressional power is subject to equal protection limitations de-
riving from the fifth amendment,1 37 and upon the reiteration that equal
131. Id at 209.
132. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
133. Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, amending Local Public Works Capital Development and
Investment Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6701 (1976)).
134. "[Tihe proper inquiry is whether racial classifications designed to further remedial pur-
poses serve important governmental objectives and are substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." 448 U.S. at 519.
135. "We need not today define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and
impermissible affirmative action plans." United Steelworkers v. Weber, 442 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
136. 448 U.S. at 549 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Powell also filed a separate opin-
ion in which he largely reiterated his Bakke criteria, but with some interesting modifications. See
text accompanying notes 159-63 infra. Justice White, who had joined the Brennan Four in Bakke,
added no further word here, but the closing paragraphs of Chief Justice Burger's opinion suggest
that Justice White also adhered to his position in Bakke. See text accompanying notes 230-33
137. 448 U.S. at 473. Since Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court has accepted that
16
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protection furnishes less restraint upon Congress "enforcing" under
section 5 than it does upon other forms of governmental action.' 38
1. The Source of Congressional Power Enacting MBE
The Burger Three found adequate congressional power to enact
MBE, insofar as it bears upon private contractors, in the spending
power and the commerce power. 13 9 However, MBE also reached con-
tractors in state and local government and so, mindful of National
League of Cities v. Usery,'4 ° as to these state and local governmental
contractors, there is resort to the enhanced power of Congress deriving
from section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Using the McCulloch v.
Maryland "appropriate" test, 4 ' as made applicable to section 5 in
South Carolina, Morgan, Mitchell, and Rome, 4 ' Chief Justice Burger
found adequate congressional evidence designing MBE as an "appro-
priate" remedial means to eliminate the discriminatory end that the
equal protection clause was designed to address. But the McCulloch v.
Maryland test also requires that congressional legislation not violate
the "letter" of the Constitution.'43 There must be inquiry whether the
equal protection rights of "any person," presumably those contractors
disadvantaged by MBE, are curtailed by the MBE provision. Hence,
judicial review of MBE, as affirmative action, in light of some equal
protection test is relevant.
2. The Equal Protection Review
The starting point for the Burger opinion was recognition that Con-
gress' authority to legislate under section 5 extends "beyond the prohi-
bition of purposeful discrimination to encompass state action that has
discriminatory impact perpetuating the effects of past discrimina-
tion.""' Congress had adequate basis before it to conclude that "mi-
nority businesses have been denied effective participation in public
contracting opportunities by procurement practices that perpetuated
the effects of prior discrimination,"' 45 and Congress could reasonably
determine that elimination of "barriers to minority firm access to pub-
lic contracting opportunities generated by the 1977 Act was appropriate
there is an equal protection component contained in the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment.
138. 448 U.S. at 473-78. See text accompanying notes 79-102 supra.
139. 448 U.S. at 477.
140. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (state governments, as employers, held not subject to federal mini-
mum wage requirements). See notes 301, 313 & 316 infra.
141. See text accompanying notes 83 & 84 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 80-102 supra.
143. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
144. 448 U.S. at 477.
145. Id at 477-78.
17
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to ensure that those businesses were not denied equal opportunity to
participate in federal grants to state and local governments, which is
one aspect of the equal protection of the laws.' 4  To this point the
opinion was treating the aspect of the McCuloch formula dealing with
"let the end be legitimate. . . .".47' It then considered the means used
to accomplish the "legitimate" end. The means, as we have just seen,
could not violate the "letter" of the Constitution. In this context, this
meant that the legislative classifications must "not violate the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment." 48 Here, in the strict sense, the equal protection review begins.
When the means used is "racial or ethnic criteria" to remedy "the
present effects of past discrimination" the congressional program must
be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal." 49 According to
the Burger opinion, the MBE program satisfied this requirement.
There was a goal of 10% participation by MBEs (who need not be "the
lowest competitive bidders"). However, only MBEs who were qualified
MBEs would benefit, and then only those whose higher bids reflected
"the present effects of prior disadvantage and discrimination." 5 O Fur-
ther, the program provided relief by administrative waiver from the
10% set-aside when a grantee's last efforts failed to identify bona fide
MBEs. Furthermore, the congressional program established an admin-
istrative "complaint procedure" designed to exclude from the program
"minority firms whose access to public contracting opportunities is not
impaired by the effects of prior discrimination." 5'
The Burger Three found no equal protection infirmity in the "inci-
dental" denial to some non-minority firms of access to some public
contracts as a result of the 10% set-aside: "such 'a sharing of the bur-
den' by innocent parties is not impermissible," especially where, as
here, the burden on "nonminority firms is relatively light."' 52 Equal
protection was not denied because of "underinclusiveness"--specifying
only certain minority groups, rather than remedying the "effects of dis-
advantage or discrimination" as to all deprived businesses.' 53 Nor was
it denied by "overinclusiveness"-bestowing some benefits that cannot
be tied into "present effects of identified prior discrimination." The
MBE administrative program of waiver and exception "provides a rea-
sonable assurance that application of racial or ethnic criteria will be
146. Id at 478.
147. See text accompanying notes 83 & 84 supra.
148. 448 U.S. at 480.
149. Id
150. Id at 481.
151. Id at 482.
152. Id at 484.
153. Congress "may take one step at a time to remedy only part of the broader problem." Id
at 485.
18
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limited to accompanying the remedial objectives .... 154
In sum, although the Burger Three suggested that the MBE program
pressed "the outer limit of congressional authority," it was "narrowly
tailored," with sufficient flexibility to "give reasonable assurance" that
it "will function within constitutional limitations."' 55 It thus survived
the "most searching examination." It would pass muster under either
Bakke formula, that of the Brennan Four or that of Justice Powell,
neither of which, however, the opinion adopted, "either expressly or
implicitly." 156
The Burger opinion stressed that the remedial authority of Congress
was broader than that of a federal court, 157 that there was here the
functional equivalent of congressional "findings," and that the chal-
lenge was mounted to the constitutionality of the MBE provision on its
face, without any showing that "as applied in identified situations the
MBE provision violated the constitutional or statutory rights of any
party to this case."'5 8
Joining in the Burger opinion, Justice Powell also wrote separately
and upheld MBE on a somewhat mellowed version of his Bakke analy-
sis. '51 In Bakke Justice Powell had said, and reiterated, that where a
racial classification was used the governmental interest must be com-
pelling or substantial, and the use of a racial classification must be
"necessary" to promote that interest. 160 In Fullilove, Justice Powell ex-
pressly affirmed that "ameliorating the disabling effects of identified
discrimination" was a compelling governmental interest. '6' He then al-
lowed that race-conscious remedies might be used if they were "equita-
ble and reasonably necessary to the redress of identified
discrimination."'' 62 This was a conscious toning down, five times re-
peated in his opinion, of the usual requirement of a "compelling state
interest" justification--that there be no less drastic means of achieving
the goal. 16
3
154. Id at 487.
155. Id at 490.
156. Id at 492.
157. Id at 483, 485-86.
158. Id at 480.
159. Id at 495-517.
160. 438 U.S. at 305, 320.
161. 448 U.S. at 496, 497. Justice Powell adhered to his Bakke view that "the legitimate inter-
est in creating a race-conscious remedy is not compelling unless an appropriate governmental
authority has found that [a constitutional or statutory] violation has occurred." Id at 498.
162. Id at 510.
163. In Bakke Justice Powell had explicitly reserved the question of the extent of review of
"legislation by Congress pursuant to its powers under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy the effects of prior discrimination." Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302 n.41 (1978). In Fullilove, Powell, alone among the Justices,
cited § 2 of the thirteenth amendment as a source of congressional power for the MBE legislation.
448 U.S. at 508.
19
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Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Blackmun and Brennan joined,
upheld the MBE set aside by simply applying the Brennan Four Bakke
test: "the racial classifications . . . are substantially related to the
achievement of the important and congressionally articulated goal of
remedying the present effects of past racial discrimination."'"
Putting together the Burger and Marshall opinions in Fullilove, af-
firmative action programs initiated by Congress that are expressly
designed to remedy the effects of past racial discrimination in a reason-
ably specified setting seem secure. But there are three caveats: (1) the
program must not burden non-minorities excessively; (2) there must be
flexibility of design adequate to forestall granting of benefits to minor-
ity persons who are not in fact disadvantaged by past discrimination;
and (3) there must be evidence before Congress (not necessarily "find-
ings" as such) from which Congress could reasonably conclude "that
traditional . . . practices when applied to minority businesses could
perpetuate the effects of past discrimination."'
' 6
II. THE COURT AND THE JUSTICES
What has been set out is a narrative outline of the work of the Burger
Court with respect to several themes of equal protection. A look to the
future requires a more judgmental account that brings to the fore less
favorable aspects of its product and process.
Much less than the Justices of the Warren Court can the members of
the Burger Court be perceived as a collective unit. This is evidenced by
the great number of cases decided without the benefit of majority opin-
ions. Between the ascent of Chief Justice Burger in 1969 and the end of
the 1979 Term, eighty-eight cases were decided without a majority
agreement as to the reasons for the decision.' 66 This exceeds the total
number of plurality opinions handed down in the entire prior history of
164. 448 at 521.
165. Id at 478.
166. Kraft, Business of the Court .. , Washington Post, June 25, 1981, § A, at 23, col. 1.
A classic example is the pair of fourth amendment cases handed down at the end of the 1980
Term, Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981) and New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860
(1981), concerning warrantless seizure of evidence contained in closed packages in the interior of
an automobile. In one case the package was in the trunk of the car, in the other in the interior
passenger space. Six Justices agreed that both cases should be decided the same way. But they
were not. In Robbins the Court did not produce a majority; the four-Justice plurality was joined
by Chief Justice Burger concurring without opinion, and Justice Powell concurring with an opin-
ion in which he reminded himself: "We have an institutional responsibility not only to respect
stare dedisis but also to make every reasonable effort to harmonize our views on constitutional
questions of broad practical application." 101 S. Ct. at 2851 n.4. See also the Court's notation in
its grant of certiorari in United States v. Ross, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 80-
2209): "The parties are directed to address the question whether the Court should reconsider
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. - (1981)."
20
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the Supreme Court.'67 The Burger Court has also featured the continu-
ing dissent of several Justices, often with little regard for matters most
recently decided. 168 An earlier Court tradition found the most vigorous
antagonists willing to accept as settled law decisions to which they had
previously dissented.'
69
Rather than blocs on the Court, one perceives nine highly individual
Justices who stubbornly maintain their particularized views even when
they cannot convince a majority to accept them. These general obser-
vations raise the question, what are the central notions in the area of
equal protection of the nine Justices who constituted the Supreme
Court at the end of the 1980 Term? We commence with the five ap-
pointees of Presidents Nixon and Ford.
Rehnquist. From the outset of his tenure, with remarkable persis-
tency, Justice Rehnquist has sought, sometimes successfully,' more
often in dissent, to reverse the nationalizing tendencies of the Warren
Court and its immediate predecessors. In the area of equal protection,
his opinions press for the narrowest review of both federal and state
legislation that allegedly abridge individual rights."'7 His dissents have
sounded impassioned resistance to those Burger Court decisions that
have supported affirmative action and remedies for past discrimina-
tion. 17
167. Id The Warren Court contributed to this tendency to plurality decisions. Of the 87
plurality decisions handed down prior to 1969, over 40 were by the Warren Court, id, many in the
first amendment obscenity cases.
168. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist are frequently within this category. On the
other hand, Justice Stevens, and often Justice Stewart, have been inclined to accept recent prior
decisional law with which they disagreed, for stare decisis reasons. In an unexpected way, how-
ever, the Burger Court has stood by the criminal justice due process decisions of the Warren
Court, even the much-maligned Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). And in the 1981 Term
the Court went so far as to give an expansive reading to Miranda. Edwards v. Arizona, 101 S. Ct.
1880 (1981). See Estelle v. Smith, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981).
169. Again, the Burger Court did not originate the deviations from this tradition. Justices
Black and Douglas continually reaffirmed their absolutist position on the scope of the first amend-
ment and refused to accept the new doctrine of merely prospective constitutional decision deriving
from Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See text accompanying note 369 infra.
170. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), Justice Rehnquist persuaded
the Court to overrule the comparatively recent decision of Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968),
with respect to the extent of Congress' power under the commerce clause in regulating activities of
state governments as employers. And in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), he persuaded a
Court majority to reinvigorate state immunity under the eleventh amendment.
171. See, e.g., United States R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980), in which he
brought the Burger Court back to the minimal rational basis review of an equal protection chal-
lenge to denial of some railroad retirement benefits. See note 48 supra See also Schweiker v.
Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074 (1981), in which the Court applied this new rational basis line to supple-
mental security benefits to patients in public mental hospitals in face of a four-Justice dissent
written by Justice Powell.
172. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (1980) (joined Stewart, J., dissenting); City of
21
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Stevens. Perhaps the most original, and hardest to peg, Justice Ste-
vens is also the Burger Court Justice most self-consciously committed
to stare decisis as a prime high court value. On this ground alone he
has adhered to later court reaffirmations of decisions with which he did
not originally agree.' 7 3 Still, he has been outspoken against the Wash-
ington v. Davis ' "purpose" requirement in equal protection and
fifteenth amendment cases, ' 75 advocating that a rule be framed in terms
of objective impact. 76 And he would prefer to the two-tier methodol-
ogy a single standard of review in all equal protection cases. 177 He
prefers that "rights" or "interests" be asserted only on behalf of indi-
viduals, rather than being identified in terms of "group" or "class."
This view was made explicit in a Title VII sex discrimination case,
178
but it seems to carry over to his analysis of affirmative action race
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 206 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219
(1979).
The conclusions reached as to Justice Rehnquist's first four Terms on the Court in Shapiro, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REv. 293 (1976) remain valid. Shapiro con-
cluded that Justice Rehnquist's criteria for constitutional decision-making could be reduced to
three basic propositions:
(1) Conflicts between an individual and the government should, whenever possible, be
resolved against the individual;
(2) Conflicts between state and federal authority, whether on an executive, legislative or
judicial level, should, whenever possible, be resolved in favor of the state; and
(3) Questions of the exercise of federal jurisdiction [including Article III questions, such
as standing, mootness, and political questions], whether on the district court, appellate court
or Supreme Court level, should, whenever possible, be resolved against such exercise.
Id at 294.
173. In Florida Dep't of Health and Rehab. Serv. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 101 S. Ct.
1032 (1981), the Court, in a per curiam decision, reversed the court of appeals on the ground that
retroactive monetary relief against a state organization was barred by the eleventh amendment
interpretation of Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun, who had all dissented in Edelman, dissented again in this case, adhering to their opinion that
Edelman was wrongly decided. Justice Stevens had not been on the Court when Edelman had
been decided, but he stated his agreement that Edelman had been incorrectly decided. He then
concurred in the per curiam reversal: "For me, the adverse consequences of adhering to an argua-
bly erroneous precedent in this case are far less serious than the consequences of further unravel-
ling the doctrine of stare decisis." 101 S. Ct. at 1036. In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190-91
(1976) he concurred on the same ground.
174. 425 U.S. 229 (1976). See text accompanying notes 21-28 supra.
175. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 91 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 253 (Stevens, J., concurring). His elaborate efforts to avoid facing up to the ques-
tions whether the "purpose" requirement applied to the thirteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. §
1982 led to his contrived and restrictive opinion for the Court in City of Memphis v. Greene, 101
S. Ct. 1584 (1981).
176. "I do not believe that it is appropriate to focus on the subjective intent of the deci-
sionmakers . . . . [A] proper test should focus on the objective effects of the political decision
rather than the subjective motivation of the decisionmaker." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
177. Bui see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). "Whatever criticism may be leveled at a
judicial opinion implying that there are at least three [equal protection) standards applies with the
same force to a double standard." Id at 212.
178. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978).
22
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cases. '79 He recognizes that great damage has been done to blacks as a
class as a result of past discrimination;1 0 however, to him the two-race
theory of the fourteenth amendment deriving from Slaughter-House
does not justify extension of special relief to newly emerged minority
groups.' 8' From this he concludes that special relief should be with-
held from all and that the Constitution must presently be interpreted in
terms of what he sees as its original "ideals"--colorblindness and indi-
vidual rather than group rights.1
82
Powell. In an insightful concurring opinion in Keyes, 83 Justice Pow-
ell professed to see no reason to distinguish the northern de facto segre-
gation from the southern de jure situation.'8 4 However, he dissented
from the Court's effective acceptance of this position six years later as
he pressed for cessation of judicial enforcement of remedial desegrega-
tion decrees.' 85 His opinion for a 5-4 Court in Rodriguez 'm6 formulated
the restrictive two-tier theory that has controlled equal protection prac-
tice through most of the Burger Court years.' 87 Yet he took a leading
role in pressing for a stronger than rational basis review of cases involv-
ing classifications based on illegitimacy. 88 And he seems ultimately to
have acknowledged that an "intermediate" level of review had been
accepted by the Court in sex discrimination cases.' 89 In his controlling
opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell flatly renounced the two-race theory
179. Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 552-54 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Congress
should identify the characteristic that justifies special treatment to a class of persons).
180. Id at 537.
181. "Quite obviously, the history of discrimination against black citizens in America cannot
justify a grant of privileges to Eskimos or Indians." 1d
182. His conclusion was advanced pragmatically as to the 10% set-aside in Fullilove: "It is
unfortunately but unquestionably true that irrational racial prejudice persists today and continues
to obstruct minority participation in a variety of economic pursuits, presumably including the
construction industry." Id at 544. Yet he found the Act unconstitutional: "It... seems clear to
me that this Act cannot be defended as an appropriate method of reducing racial prejudice." Id
at 545.
The Constitution does not identify itself as "colorblind"--that conception derives from Justice
Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). The remedial design of the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, and the enforcement power given Congress under
section 5, rather suggest a color-awareness.
183. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 217 (1973).
184. "There is... no reason as a matter of constitutional principle to adhere to the de jure/de
facto distinction in school desegregation cases. In addition, there are reasons of policy and pru-
dent judicial administration which point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national rule."
Id at 232. "[W]e should acknowledge that whenever public school segregation exists to a sub-
stantial degree there is prima facie evidence of a constitutional violation by the responsible school
board." Id at 235.
185. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 479-84 (1979).
186. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
187. Id at 4-59. See text accompanying notes 37-46 supra.
188. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972).
189. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 349, 359 (1979).
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of fourteenth amendment analysis in race cases, admitting that it once
had justification, but it had become outdated by subsequent judicial
developments. 90 His strident language in Bakke on this point seems
somewhat softened by his Fullilove '9' concurrence upholding congres-
sional action to remedy past racial discrimination. And in both Bakke
and Fullilove, alone among members of the Court, he cited the thir-
teenth amendment as a partial justification for remedial congressional
affirmative action. 92 While this approach would by-pass the equal
protection clause, it leaves Justice Powell more open than his Bakke
opinion would suggest to the possibility of federal affirmative action in
racial cases when there is congressional initiative. However, it keeps
relatively limited the possibility of state-initiated or voluntary affirma-
tive action, and does not extend to sex discrimination.
93
Blackmun. The chief independent contribution of Justice Blackmun
to equal protection analysis was his ill-starred opinion adding alienage
to the "suspect classification" category.' 94 The Court has so seriously
qualified the Graham decision'95 as to leave doubt in the minds of one
leading equal protection scholar whether the alienage addition is still
viable law.' 96
As to affirmative action in the racial area, Justice Blackmun, alone
among the Burger era appointees, has avowedly proclaimed the two-
race theory of equal protection. 97 He adhered to the Brennan Four
opinion in Bakke, which would have upheld the Davis preferential ad-
missions program using an "intermediate" test comparable to that re-
cently fashioned by the Court for gender classifications. In a separate
opinion in Bakke, he expressly rejected Justice Powell's pronounce-
ment that the two-race theory was outdated.' 98 To Justice Blackmun
the promise of Slaughter-House'99 remains unfulfilled and binding.
Burger. Chief Justice Burger wrote opinions for a unanimous Court
in 1971 that upheld busing as a remedy for de jure segregation 2°° and
190. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). See text accompanying
notes 64-68 supra.
191. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See text accompanying note 71 supra.
192. See note 163 supra. 448 U.S. at 508; 438 U.S. at 302 n.41.
193. Without ratification of the equal rights amendment (ERA), sex discrimination can be
reached only under the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment. See note 358 infra.
194. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
195. See cases cited in note 42 supra.
196. G. GUNTHER, supra note 41, at 89.
197. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
198. 438 U.S. 265, 402-08 (1978).
199. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See text accompanying notes 50-52
supra.
200. Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
24
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held that "discriminatory impact," without a showing of discriminatory
intent, could constitute a violation of Title VII, the equal employment
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 However, two crucial 5-4
decisions of the Court in 1973202 and 1974203 "brought school desegre-
gation to a halt in metropolitan areas where. . . the ghetto core of the
cities is black or some other racial minority, and the surrounding
suburbs, in separate districts, white." 2" In each of these decisions
Chief Justice Burger was in the restrictive majority. 0 5 In Bakke he
was in the Stevens Four, which rejected the preferential admissions
plan without reaching the constitutional equal protection issue. In
Weber he joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent, on statutory interpreta-
tion grounds.2" Until Fullilove,207 in 1980, it was thus difficult to iden-
tify Chief Justice Burger's constitutional position with respect to
affirmative action. Putting that opinion together with Griggs20° it
seems that, without taking a clear stance on equal protection, he is pre-
pared to uphold certain specific congressional action expressly taken to
remedy the effects of past racial discrimination.
What of the Justices who had also served on the Warren Court-
Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall?
Brennan. In Warren Court days perhaps no Justice made it more
difficult to insist upon the two-race theory of equal protection than Jus-
tice Brennan, who launched the "one person, one vote" wave of equal
protection litigation in 1962 in Baker v. Carr.2" In the same vein was
Justice Brennan's determined, but ultimately unsuccessful, effort to
have sex raised to the level of "suspect classification."2 ' Each of these
thrusts detracted from the Slaughter-House proposition that equal pro-
tection was primarily, though not exclusively, related to racial discrimi-
nation.21 In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey212 in 1977, on the
eve of Bakke, Justice Brennan voiced his misgivings about "benign dis-
crimination. '213 And in Bakke his opinion required a higher standard
201. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
202. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
203. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
204. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 119 (1980).
205. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
206. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219 (1979).
207. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
208. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
209. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
210. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 93 (1973) (plurality opinion).
211. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
212. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
213. Id at 172-75.
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than "rational basis" to justify the Davis affirmative action program.24
However, his ringing justification of the voluntary affirmative action
program in Weber called upon the Slaughter-House principle without
reciting the two-race concept of equal protection.215 Ultimately, it
seems, Justice Brennan was successful in persuading the Court to ac-
cept an intermediate level of justification for a gender classification.
21 6
However, he has to date been unable to rally more than four Justices to
the same intermediate test for an affirmative action classification in
matters of race.217
Stewart. As suggested in another article in this issue,21 8 Justice Stew-
art has throughout his long tenure on the Court found various judicial
means for circumventing discrimination based upon race. These have
included resort to the thirteenth amendment,21 9 to the right of interstate
travel,220 and to detecting the presence of subtle state action.221 Al-
though he sidestepped the equal protection issue in Bakke by joining
the Stevens Four opinion,22 2 he joined the majority opinion in Weber
which upheld a voluntary affirmative action plan including "race-con-
scious steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally seg-
regated job categories.1223 This track record led a recent author in this
Journal to the incautious speculation that Justice Stewart was a prime
candidate to supply the fifth vote necessary to make the Brennan Four
opinion in Bakke the equal protection rule of the Supreme Court with
respect to affirmative action.224 In three opinions in the 1979 Term Jus-
tice Stewart layed that speculation to rest. Despite his generous views
with respect to the sweep of the thirteenth amendment in racial matters,
his perception of the range of the equal protection clause, and of Con-
gress' power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, as to racial
(as well as other) matters, is as restricted as that of any Justice on the
Court. In all three of these cases he spoke with Justice Rehnquist.
22
214. 438 U.S. at 358-62.
215. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
216. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
217. Justices White, Blackmun, and Marshall joined in his Bakke opinion. See note 224 infra.
218. See V. Broderick, Mr. Justice Stewart, pp. 305-11 supra.
219. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968).
220. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
221. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
222. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408-21.
223. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209.
224. Broderick, Bakke, Weber and Mr. Justice Stewart, 11 N.C. Cent. L.J. 3, 71 (1979).
225. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 206 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Mo-
bile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980) (plurality opinion); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 101 S. Ct. 2211,
2223 (1981), Justice Stewart's dissent made clear his disaffection with affirmative action: "So far
as the Constitution goes, a private person may. engage in any racial discrimination he wants, cf.
26
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White. To the penetrating comments made earlier in this issue226 on
Justice White's opinions while sitting on the Burger Court only a few
words need be added. Justice White seems disturbed with the overex-
tended use that the Court has recently given his "purpose" requirement
in Washington v. Davis22v for an equal protection violation. In City of
Mobile v. Bolden221 he dissented because the Court was unwilling to
accept the lower courts' ruling "that an invidious discriminatory pur-
pose could be inferred from the totality of facts in this case."'229 How-
ever, in that dissent he did not challenge Justice Stewart's extension of
the Washington v. Davis "purpose" requirement to the fifteenth amend-
ment. Justice White's adherence to Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
Fullilove,230 rather than to Justice Marshall's opinion in that case,2 '
does not seem to represent a departure from his Bakke views (when he
joined the Brennan Four). White has repeatedly accented the en-
hanced power of Congress when it relies upon section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment 232-- the root of the Burger opinion in Fullilove.
Furthermore, the Burger opinion, which White joined, expressly re-
cited that "our analysis demonstrates that the MBE provision would
survive judicial review under either 'test' articulated in the several
Bakke opinions." '233 This passage was obviously designed to accom-
modate both concurrees-Justice Powell and Justice White.
Marshall. In a series of opinions commencing with his dissent in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,234 Justice Marshall
inveighed against the rigid two-tier (compelling state interest or ra-
tional basis) equal protection analysis which the Court institutionalized
in that case. 235 He opted for a sliding scale approach:
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, (1979) but under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment a sovereign state may never do so. And it is wholly irrelevant ...
whether the discrimination is called 'affirmative action' or by some less euphemistic term."
226. Daye, Justice Byron A White, pp. 260-78 supra.
227. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
228. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
229. Id at 95.
230. 448 U.S. at 453.
231. Id at 517.
232. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J.,
concurring).
233. 448 U.S. at 492.
234. 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
235. 1 must once more voice my disagreement with the Court's rigidified approach to equal
protection analysis. The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases
fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review-strict
scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in the field of equal protection defy
such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has
applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal
Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with
27
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The task in every case should be to determine the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not men-
tioned in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific constitu-
tional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the
nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree
of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discrimi-
natory basis must be adjusted accordingly.
2 36
In Rodriguez this should have led the Court, said Justice Marshall, to
give more than a rational basis scrutiny to the educational interests dis-
advantaged by the Texas legislation.
237
Although Justice Marshall has been the most relentless advocate on
the Court of the Slaughter-House two-race analysis of equal protection,
he was also in the forefront of the Court's enhancement of equal pro-
tection interests that concerned "any person" without reference to race.
He supported the apportionment decisions with their one-person-one-
vote, 238 the raising of alienage to a "suspect classification," 239 and Jus-
tice Brennan's unsuccessful effort to raise sex to the level of a "suspect
classification." 24° When this last effort failed Justice Marshall persisted
in striving to have sex and illegitimacy, and even age, given more than
the deferential "rational basis" review.24' Yet Justice Marshall has
continually reminded the Court of its Slaughter-House heritage. In
1976, in a dissent arguing for protection of the elderly against job ter-mination, he said: "Of course, the Court is quite right in suggesting
that distinctions exist between the elderly and traditional suspect
classes such as Negroes, and between the elderly and 'quasi-suspect'
classes such as women or illegitimates. ' '24 2 Justice Marshall's sliding
scale analysis of equal protection was never accepted by the Court, but
he was ultimately vindicated by the breakdown of the rigid two-tier
which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitu-
tional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidious-
ness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.
Id at 98-99 (citations omitted).
236. Id at 102-03.
237. Id at 109-10, 129-30.
238. Although Justice Marshall was not on the Court when the early reapportionment cases,
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553 (1964), were decided, he
joined the majority in such prominent later reapportionment cases as Avery v. Midland County,
390 U.S. 474 (1968), Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970), Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
394 U.S. 526 (1969), and Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), in which he wrote the majority
opinion.
239. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). He dissented from the Court's retreat from
this doctrine in Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 302 (1978) and in Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68, 81 (1979) where he joined Justice Blackmun's dissent.
240. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
241. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
242. Id at 325.
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analysis in gender and illegitimacy cases, at least.243
We will probably have to await disclosures from subsequent biogra-
phies and autobiographies of the Justices to learn the full impact within
the Court of Justice Marshall's eloquent separate opinion in Bakke.2"
But reference is already appropriate to some of its passages:
I do not agree that petitioner's admission program violates the Consti-
tution. For it must be remembered that, during most of the past 200
years, the Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the
most ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination against the Ne-
gro. Now, when a State acts to remedy the effects of that legacy of
discrimination, I cannot believe that this same Constitution stands as a
barrier.245
.. . The position of the Negro today in America is the tragic but
inevitable consequence of centuries of unequal treatment.246
. . . In light of the sorry history of discrimination and its devastating
impact on the lives of Negroes, bringing the Negro into the mainstream
of American life should be a state interest of the highest order. To fail
to do so is to ensure that America will forever remain a divided soci-
ety.
2 4 7
Noting the Supreme Court's past rejection of the Slaughter-House
promise, Justice Marshall added:
Most importantly, had the Court been willing in 1896, in Plessy v.
Ferguson, to hold that the Equal Protection Clause forbids differences
in treatment based on race, we would not be faced with this dilemma in
1978 .... The majority of the Court rejected the principle of color-
blindness, and for the next 58 years, from Plessy to Brown v. Board of
Education, ours was a Nation where, by law, an individual could be
given "special" treatment based on the color of his skin ...
It is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we now must per-
mit the institutions of this society to give consideration to race in mak-
ing decisions about who will hold the positions of influence, affluence,
and prestige in America ...
I fear that we have come full circle. After the Civil War our Govern-
ment started several "affirmative action" programs. This Court in the
Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson destroyed the movement to-
ward complete equality. For almost a century no action was taken, and
this nonaction was with the tacit approval of the courts. Then we had
Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Acts of Congress,
followed by numerous affirmative-action programs. Now, we have this
Court again stepping in, this time to stop affirmative-action programs
243. See text accompanying notes 44 & 45 supra.
244. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978).
245. Id at 387.
246. Id at 395.
247. Id at 396.
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of the type used by the University of California. 248
Following this plea, the Supreme Court in 1979 in Weber and in
1980 in Fullilove upheld affirmative action programs, but with careful
reservations.249 We have noted that Justice Powell in somewhat modi-
fying his harsh Bakke ban of the two-race theory, actually borrowed
Justice Marshall's words of blame for the Supreme Court as part of the
problem.25°
But Justice Marshall's strongest warning to the Court attacked the
plurality opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden,251 which purported to
extend to the fifteenth amendment the "purposeful" requirement of
Washington v. Davis2 2 and declined to infer racially discriminatory
"purpose" from a "totality of facts" as to local electoral practices. In
Bolden the Supreme Court reversed the lower federal courts' holding
that multi-member legislative districts unconstitutionally diluted the
voting strength of black citizens in the Alabama municipality. 2 3 "The
right to vote is granted in form, but denied in substance," concluded
Justice Marshall.
It is time to realize that manipulating doctrines and drawing im-
proper distinctions under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
... [make] this Court an accessory to the perpetuation of racial dis-
crimination .... If this Court refuses to honor our long-recognized
principle that the Constitution 'nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-
minded modes of discrimination', it cannot expect the victims of dis-
crimination to respect political channels of seeking redress. I dis-
sent.254
III. THE CURRENT PRODUCT-AND BEYOND?
It is time to summarize, and to risk a few predictions.
A. Schools
The Columbus and Dayton 11255 cases promise a continuation of
court-supervised desegregation in the schools, both north and south.
248. Id at 401-02.
249. See text accompanying notes 125-58 supra.
250. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 566 (1980). See text accompanying notes 159-63
supra.
251. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
252. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
253. In Mobile the issue was purely constitutional, unlike the Court's companion decision in
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), which involved interpretation of section 4(a)
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, in which Justice Marshall wrote
the majority opinion for the Court. In the constitutional case, unlike the statutory one, the Court
held the Washington v. Davis purposeful discrimination must be shown. 446 U.S. at 62.
254. 446 U.S. at 55, 141 (citations omitted).
255. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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But the deprivation of multi-district remedies256 and of equality in
school district financing2 57 makes significant progress unlikely in many
metropolitan areas.
B. Discriminatory Purpose Requirement
Since Washington v. Davis,"' an equal protection violation requires
the showing of a discriminatory purpose. While purpose may, in the-
ory, be inferred from an egregious set of objective facts there is no ade-
quate guide in the decisions as to what facts will suffice, and proof of
subjective discriminatory intent is remarkably difficult to come by. The
obstacle is immense. The bewilderment is dense even in the courts of
appeal.259
C. Equal Protection Methodology
The two-tier theory has been expanded to include a third, intermedi-
ate tier.26° The top tier of strict scrutiny and compelling state interest
has been severely confined. 26' The suspect classifications are limited to
race and nationality, and alienage. But alienage has become questiona-
ble.2 62 The fundamental rights part of the top tier seems rigidly limited
to voting rights, access to courts and a right to interstate travel.263 The
new intermediate tier certainly includes sex,26 but the Court's inconsis-
tent applications of its illegitimacy standard defy analysis.265 In the
lower catch-all tier of equal protection the Court seems to have settled
upon the most deferential possible formula, "rational relation to a legit-
imate state interest," after several years of speculating about a more
demanding test.266
256. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
257. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See text accom-
panying note 204 supra.
258. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See text accompanying notes 20-28 supra.
259. E.g., Jones v. City of Lubbock, 640 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1980) (Goldberg, J., specially
concurring). Judge Goldberg's exasperation, "mine is not to make reply, mine is not to reason
why," id at 777, was directed to the Supreme Court's "indecisive opinion [sic] and amorphous
holding" in City of Mobile v. Bolden. 640 F.2d at 779. However, he took measured aim at the
"subjective intent to discriminate standard" of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights, id at
778 n.6, and concluded that "[wlithout guidance from above, the lower courts are sentenced to a
term of confusion." Id at 779.
260. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
261. See text accompanying notes 41 & 42 supra.
262. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
263. This category remains close to the content received from the Warren Court. See note 36
supra. But the "access to courts" has been generalized. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
See Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
264. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
265. Compare Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1967) with Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
See text accompanying notes 45 & 188 supra.
266. See note 48 supra.
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The Court, as a Court, has not specifically rejected out of hand the
Slaughter-House notion that equal protection has a more intense appli-
cation in matters of race. 67 But Justice Powell's prediction in Bakke
that it is passe268 still looms large, despite the flat rejection of his view
by four members of the current Court. 69
D. Sex
Until the 1980 Term the Court seemed clearly to have settled upon
the Craig v. Boren27° formula ("substantial relation to an important
state interest") as the intermediate constitutional standard for testing
classifications based on sex. It may be suggested that two cases in that
Term have shaken this assurance. While both the statutory rape case,
Michael M v. Superior Court, 27' and the better known draft case,
Rostker v. Goldberg,27 2 by-passed the intermediate test, they each pro-
ceeded upon special considerations and Craig v. Boren is probably
alive, if not as well as before. More threatening to the firmness of Craig
v. Boren is the incongruity of the Court's prevailing standards in be-
nign discriminations as to sex and race. One defending a benign sex
discrimination, under Craig v. Boren, must show only a substantial re-
lation to an important governmental interest. However one defending
a benign race discrimination must show, under the Bakke opinion of
Justice Powell, a compelling governmental interest. This disparity, in
light of the Slaughter-House tradition, is obviously irrational and
awaits future correction by the Court (of what sort, who can say).
E. The Enforcement Clauses
The Burger Court seems to have institutionalized the Warren Court's
effort to reinvigorate section 5, the enforcement clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and section 2 of the fifteenth as well.273 More than likely,
when the issue is squarely tested, the Court will look more favorably
upon congressional action under section 5 that deals with remedies,
than upon congressional redefinition of the "substantive" content of
fourteenth amendment rights.274 But City of Rome v. United States
275
suggests that "remedial" will be construed broadly by the Court.276
267. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
268. See text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.
269. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and White. See text accompanying note 123
supra.
270. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
271. 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981).
272. 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
273. See text accompanying notes 79-102 supra.
274. See text accompanying notes 93-102 supra.
275. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
276. Id at 182. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
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F. Affirmative Action
Fullilove gave a qualified green light to federal affirmative action.
Far less clear is the future of non-congressional affirmative action pro-
grams. State or local government programs must, of course, comply
with the equal protection limitation of the fourteenth amendment. For
the moment, at least, that seems to entail compliance with both Bakke
formulas.277 This, indeed, is the course taken by the California
Supreme Court in recently upholding the post-Bakke special admis-
sions program of the University of California at Davis Law School. 7 8
A strictly voluntary program by a non-private employer would presum-
ably be subject to the message in Weber: a voluntary affirmative action
plan "designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in tradition-
ally segregated job categories"27 would be legal provided it was lim-
ited as to time and did not "unnecessarily trammel" the rights of
others.28 0 But there is no guarantee in Weber that a voluntary private
plan in the employment category beyond this close-knit framework
would survive the decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail28' that Title
VII bans all racial discrimination in employment-against whites as
well as blacks. Of course, a voluntary, private sector affirmative action
plan outside of the employment area (the coverage of Title VII) gener-
ally would not be within reach of the Federal Constitution or laws.
As the above analysis of Bakke, Weber, and Fullilove28 2 suggests, the
Court has approached affirmative action cautiously, neither rejecting it
out of hand, nor giving assurance of its survival beyond demonstrably
remedial situations.
Such modest predictions may be tentatively extrapolated from our
narrative of what the Burger Court has done. On the other hand, from
the individuating tendencies which we have atiributed to the particular
Justices no firm principled consensus as to equal protection is available,
given the present membership of the Court. One expects movement,
but knows not where, or why. A Burger Court watcher may seek reas-
surance in Heracitus' notion that all is in flux. 283 But when the Court's
formula of the day is left to the chance of who writes a particular opin-
277. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See text accompanying notes 115-24 supra.
278. DeRonde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 28 Cal. 3d 875, 625 P.2d 220, 172 Cal. Rptr. 677
(1981).
279. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979).
280. Id at 208.
281. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
282. See text accompanying notes 113-65 supra.
283. Recent extrajudicial contributions of Justices and former Justices offer minimal illumina-
tion as to criteria for the Court's constitutional decision-making. See Goldberg, RelectionsAbout
the United States Supreme Court, 5 NOVA L.J. 159 (1981) (discussing "myths about the Court");
Rehnquist, "All Discord, Harmony Not Understood, " The Performance ofthe Supreme Court of the
United States, 22 Aiz. L. REV. 973 (1981) (defending dissents and concurrences as part of the
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ion,284 or it is so phrased as to invite erratic interpretation, the effect is
unsettling on the lower courts, on practitioners advising clients, on
teachers presenting "the law" to their students, and, above all, on per-
sons and groups in the society whose rights are at stake.
This uncomfortable realization leaves us with Professor Tribe's ru-
mination in face of the Bakke decision: better chaos and uncertainty
that doesn't do too much harm than consistent and principled decision-
making which reaches an undesirable result (leaving it to each reader
to supply his or her definition of "undesirable").285
Does the constitutional process as it has developed give us any basis
for expecting more principled certainty from the Court? This question
cannot be answered without achieving a measure of agreement as to
the nature of the constitutional process.
IV. THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS
Sixty years ago Benjamin Cardozo, a state appellate judge, delivered
a series of law school lectures and published them as a classic volume
in judicial method-The Nature of the Judicial Process.286 Much in
that volume was prophetic, much is dated, but little is obsolete. In ad-
vance of most of his contemporaries, Cardozo spoke confidently of the
judge as a "legislator. '287 He recognized that this role was occasional
in an ordinary court, frequent for a constitutional judge. 288  But his
illustrations of constitutional process were only occasional.289 Later,
Judge Cardozo became Justice Cardozo of the United States Supreme
Court, but beyond his opinions he left no special treatment of the con-
stitutional process. If he had, this treatment would likely be in need of
"check and balance" of the federal judicial system, while conceding that "we may overdo dissent
and separate concurrences," id at 986).
284. Compare Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 101 S. Ct. 1195 (1981) with Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981) (two sex classification cases decided on March 23, 1981). In Kirch-
berg the Court in a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Marshall routinely applied the Craig Y. Boren
intermediate formula for gender classification. The plurality opinion written by Justice Rehnquist
in Michael M. (joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Powell) raises serious ques-
tion as to the Court's continued commitment to the Craig v. Boren test. See 101 S. Ct. at 1207
n.10.
285. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTTIONAL LAW I (Supp. 1979)
In a divided nation, the Court's task often becomes one of pragmatic statecraft. Given the
absence of a more enlightened liberating consensus, it is perhaps best the Court proceed by
leaving open possibilities for more constructive constitutional development-even at the price
of further doctrinal disarray. Far from lamenting the inconclusiveness of the Court's Bakke
decision, for example, I am inclined to applaud the way in which the Court there cleared the
path to progressive future results while accommodating the reservations deeply felt by many
with respect to preferential treatment.
286. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss (1921) [hereinafter cited as CAR-
DOZO].
287. Id at 115.
288. Id at 17, 71.
289. Id at 17-18, 76-94.
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drastic updating, so great have been the developments in the genera-
tions since he left the court.
What follows assumes that there is today an identifiable constitu-
tional process. In many particulars it dates from the time of the
Roosevelt Court.29 In subsection A, I undertake a tentative descrip-
tion. In subsection B, I inquire whether the suggested analysis is pre-
dictive of how the Supreme Court is likely to decide some pressing
current issues. In subsection C, I consider whether the analysis helps to
understand what the Burger Court has done in some areas discussed
earlier. Finally, in subsection D, I inquire whether the suggested pro-
cess is normative 9 '-that is, a basis for criticizing results reached by
the Court.
A. Constitutional Morality, a Description. Tensions, Leading Ideas,
Factors of Constitutional Process
There are provisions of the Constitution that are explicit,292 or as to
which case precedent is clear and acceptable.2 93 With such specimens
we are not here concerned. But, as Cardozo pointed OUt, 294 other con-
stitutional language is vague and inconclusive, and for the content of
constitutional law we rely almost completely upon the elaboration of
the Supreme Court. Obvious examples are due process of law, com-
merce among the several states, and the clause which this volume has
memorialized, equal protection of the laws. To say that the Supreme
Court in elaborating these general clauses serves like a legislator is, to a
certain extent, illuminating.295  But we cannot rest with this insight.
For the Supreme Court remains a judicial body, and it is fair to expect
that all its work be done according to standards. What are the elements
of constitutional process and policy-what we may fairly call constitu-
290. President Roosevelt's first appointment to the Court was Justice Black in 1937. By 1941
he had appointed seven of the nine sitting Justices, not including promotion of Justice Stone to
Chief Justice. The Court consisted of a majority of Roosevelt appointees until the death of Justice
Jackson in 1954, shortly after President Eisenhower appointed Chief Justice Warren.
291. The distinction between descriptive, predictive, and normative intended here is tradi-
tional. It is explained at text accompanying notes 509-23 infra.
292. E.g., art. I, § 3: "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State. . .and each Senator shall have one vote."
293. Although there is no express provision in the Constitution authorizing the Supreme Court
to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress it deems in violation of the Constitution, such has
been the accepted law since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
294. CARDOZO, supra note 286, at 85-87.
295. Cardozo drew heavily on Holmes here, quoting a celebrated passage from Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 466 (1897):
I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing
considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often pro-
claimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very ground
and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious.
Id at 467, quoted in CARDOZO, supra note 286, at 118-19.
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tional morality296-- that guide the Court to its elaborations of constitu-
tional law? That is the immediate inquiry.
Constitutional process, in the sense of an accepted basis by which the
Supreme Court arrives at its decisions in these open areas, goes beyond
a judicial methodology. It includes an awareness of the major ten-
sions297 contained in the Constitution and an identification of its lead-
ing or fundamental ideas. 98 Constitutional process also embraces
certain factors that the Court considers in dealing with the tensions and
fundamental ideas presented by a specific case. I shall deal with the
tensions, fundamental ideas, and factors integral to the constitutional
process in that order.
1. Tensions
Tensions in the sense used here are confficts between pairs of inter-
ests which a society legitimates without giving permanent predomi-
296. What really matters is this, that the judge is under a duty, within the limits of his power
of innovation, to maintain a relation between law and morals, between the precepts of juris-
prudence and those of reason and good conscience. . . . The constant insistence that moral-
ity and justice are not law, has tended to breed distrust and contempt of law as something to
which morality and justice are not merely alien, but hostile.
CARDOZO, supra note 286, at 133-34. And, Cardozo adds: "miffs power of interpretation must be
lodged somewhere, and the custom of the constitution has lodged it in the judges. If they are to
fulfill their function as judges, it could hardly be lodged elsewhere." Id at 135-36.
I use the term "constitutional morality" in this paper in a special sense that borrows more from
Hart and Sacks, see note 531 infra, and H.L.A. Hart, see note 523 infra, than from Cardozo or
Fuller. What are the understandings upon which the American constitutional system is based,
both structural and processwise? Once identified, I suggest, it is the essence of constitutional mo-
rality to follow them, and not to proceed ad hoc. I tentatively suggest that the basic ingredients
include certain tensions built into the constitutional system, certain fundamental or leading ideas,
and some factors of process.
Professor Fuller, smarting under the positivist separation of morality from law, was content to
argue for a legal morality that was almost strictly procedural. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW (1964).
This limited comment in no way disparages the brilliant, but largely unsuccessful, efforts by
Professor Fuller to counter the predominance of positivism and realism. See Fuller, The Forms
and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 349 (1978); Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness
and the Consultative Process.- An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REv. 410 (1978); Summers,
Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence andAmerica's Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 433
(1978). The latter study sponsors the unhelpful redesignation of the American legal realists (with
the addition of John Dewey) as "pragmatic instrumentalists," which the author then, perhaps
correctly, proclaims as "America's dominant philosophy of law." He adds that "for most adher-
ents of pragmatic instrumentalism, law serves simply as means to external goals. It thus consists
essentially of instruments." Id at 437. It is against such impoverishment that Ronald Dworkin
has been struggling. See text accompanying note 535 infra.
297. Discussed in text accompanying notes 299-344 infra.
298. Discussed in text accompanying notes 345-555 infra. A caution as to my terminology is
necessary. I use the terms fundamental ideas and leading ideas interchangeably. What I have in
mind is discussed in the text accompanying notes 345-55 infra. At the outset I must make clear
that I do not identify these terms with "fundamental rights" or "fundamental interests" as used by
the Supreme Court in due process and equal protection contexts, see text accompanying notes 36-
41 supra, although there will be of necessity some overlapping.
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nance to one over the other. Constitutional tensions reflect tensions in
the society itself. Every significant constitutional case implicates one or
more of these pairs. To recognize the major tensions, the pairs of inter-
ests in conflict, in any constitutional case is only a first step. Beyond
the tensions are the fundamental ideas that are at stake-perhaps also
in conflict-in the particular case. These too must be identified before
adjudicating the competing personal claims according to an accepted
process of constitutional dispute resolution.299
Some tensions were deliberately enshrined in the Constitution at the
outset; others developed later.3" The tension of nation vs. states is at
the core of the notion of federalism,30' the most original contribution of
the American Constitution to governmental theory. The tension of
courts vs. legislature3" 2 (and for that matter legislature vs. executive,
and courts vs. executive) 30 3 was also written into the original Constitu-
tion. The tension of national government vs. individual was sharpened
by the adoption of the first ten amendments (the Bill of Rights) in
1791. 3  Individual tension with state governments became a major
constitutional concern only with the adoption of the post-Civil War
amendments (thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth) in 1866-1870.305 As
299. A theory of constitutional tensions rejects as unacceptable the notion that constitutional
judges are restricted to determining the meaning of constitutional provisions by the traditional
judicial interpretative guides of text, context, and legislative history. Even in statutory interpreta-
tion, courts, on occasion, resort to ascertaining the "spirit" of a statute. See text accompanying
note 481 i'fa.
300. The constitutional framers left many questions unresolved, some by choice, and some,
perhaps, as a result of deliberate compromise. The same can be said of the Congress which
adopted the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments, in 1791 and the most significant subsequent
amendment, the fourteenth, in 1868. Such tensions I refer to as "deliberate." See text accompa-
nying notes 301-06 infra. Another set of tensions emerged as a result of developments in the
society, and new awarenesses, subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution and these major
amendments. These I refer to as "developmental" tensions. See text accompanying notes 307-12
infra.
301. The doctrine that the Constitution gives the federal government limited powers specified
therein, but includes powers fairly implied from those expressly given, has been firm since McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The significance of the tenth amendment as a
reminder of the reserved powers of the states has been heightened by two decisions of the Burger
Court, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) and National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976).
302. The tension between courts and legislature is most obviously presented by the doctrine of
judicial review. See note 293 supra. But it is also presented on the federal scene by the control
given Congress over the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See text accompanying notes 431-43
ifra.
303. These tensions deriving from the separation of powers doctrine have been examined by
the Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (legislative
vs. executive) and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (court vs. executive).
304. Significant, but limited, protection of the individual against federal government action
(art. I, § 9), and against state government action (art. I, § 10) was afforded by the original Consti-
tution.
305. In Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), the Supreme Court had
held that the first ten amendments did not apply to state action. In pre-Civil War days the Consti-
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a result of these amendments, a tension which was always present in
American societya°6--the tension of race, black vs. white-took on new
constitutional significance.
In contemporary society the above tensions remain and new ones
compete for constitutional recognition: individuals vs. private groups,
arising chiefly in the labor"°7 and free exercise of religion 30 8 fields; male
vs. female;3°" majority vs. new identified racial minorities;310 and, as
yet dimly perceived, present generation vs. future generations,3 1  ac-
cented in conservationist and environmental law,31 2 but more generally
relevant.
In a given case there may be something to be said for and against
each of the competing interests in tension.31 3 Clusters of similar results
tilting to one of the interests in tension constitute a trend. A trend may
overreach itself and be arrested, then a counter-trend may set in. This
is the history of Congress' power under the commerce clause, involving
the nation vs. state tension: broad national power under Chief Justice
Marshall's Court,314 then restricted national power from mid- 19th cen-
tury until 1937, 3' 5 then broad national power in vogue to this day.31 6
tution's chief protection to individuals against state governments was via the "obligation of con-
tracts" clause of article I, § 10.
306. The original Constitution had express (art. I, § 2, cl. 3) and implicit (art. I, § 9, cl. 1)
provisions affirming slavery. In the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857), the Supreme Court actually declared unconstitutional an act of Congress banning slavery
in the territories.
307. Eg. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); International Bhd. of
Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971).
308. Eg. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160 (1976).
309. Recall that until the enactment of the nineteenth amendment in 1920, women were not
even secured the right to vote, and that until Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 422 (1975), women
could be constitutionally excluded from service on juries.
310. See note 68 supra; notes 340 & 449 infra.
311. Because discussion of this tension in constitutional matters has been almost non-existent
to date, I do not stress it in this study as much as I would like to. For a discussion of "how far the
present generation is bound [in justice, not law] to respect the claims of its successors," see J.
RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 284-93 (1971).
312. The conservationist idea, whose strength dates from the early part of this century, and the
environmental idea, which first drew significant governmental recognition in the 1960's and
1970's, are both rooted, in large part, in a concern for future generations as well as the present
generation.
313. Hence, the lively discussion and strongly held positions in majority and minority opin-
ions of the Court where such tensions are the focal point of decision. Compare Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183 (1968) with National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the case which
overruled it only eight years later.
314. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the
Court left open the possibility that Congress' power over interstate commerce was exclusive. The
Court never accepted this view.
315. A more narrow view of national power, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), ended with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942).
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In many respects constitutional law as we know it, and some of the
major tensions present today, began with the enactment of the thir-
teenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments in 1866-1870, after the
Civil War. Slavery was abolished,317 citizenship was conferred on all
persons born in the United States, and all persons were guaranteed
against state action due process of law and the equal protection of the
laws.31s Although the vote was guaranteed to none, the vote could not
be denied on the basis of race.3 9 The fourteenth amendment height-
ened the constitutional tensions between federal courts and the states320
and between the states and individuals.32' The Court purported to vin-
dicate individual rights against state 322 and national323 social legisla-
tion, generally through the due process clauses.324 Perversely however,
almost till Warren days the Supreme Court responded laggardly to
continuing state discrimination against the new black citizens.325 The
first truly liberating thrust of the Civil War Amendments came not in
the race area, for which they were chiefly designed, but by enforcement
of the first amendment against the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.326 Major parts of this development were
in place by the advent of the Roosevelt Court in 1940.327
316. The broad nationalizing trend was interrupted, if not arrested, by the Burger Court deci-
sion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which for the first time in 40 years
found in the tenth amendment limitations on Congress' power over commerce.
317. See note 61 supra.
318. See note 54 upra.
319. U.S. CONST. amend. XV: "Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation."
320. The Court's early wariness was reflected in Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873). See also Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REV. 643
(1909).
321. Prior to the fourteenth amendment an individual's challenge to state legislation was
largely limited to reliance on the state constitution. See note 304 upra. As the Court shed its
early wariness, commencing about 1890, see Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418
(1890), individuals could effectively challenge state legislation by way of the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause. The Court's new receptivity to a substantive due process challenge
peaked in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
322. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
323. Eg., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (the Supreme Court extending its new
activism to the fifth amendment's due process component).
324. The same effect was often achieved by the Court's restrictive interpretation of the com-
merce clause. See text accompanying note 315 supra.
325. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (18%); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
326. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
327. By 1937 the Court had decided cases involving speech, press, and assembly: Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937), Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (speech); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1933), Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (press); DeJonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly). The religion cases would follow in 1946, Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (foreshadowed by Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940)).
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The New Deal Court's328 chief concerns were with the nation vs.
state tension (withdrawing judicial objections to congressional legisla-
tion),3 29 and with the courts vs. legislature tension (lightening the grip
of judicial review). 330 But it also gave the first effective judicial relief
since Civil War days to victims of the black vs. white tension (largely
confined to countering racial discrimination in voting).33 1 It remained
to the Warren Court, as we have seen, to give to black citizens the first
credible implementation of the equal protection promised by the four-
teenth amendment in 1868.332 At the same time the Warren Court
dealt with another tension, enforcing against the states on behalf of
individuals constitutional guarantees of particular provisions of the
first eight amendments. 333 The Warren Court not only brushed with
the nation vs. state, and court vs. legislature tensions, but it sided with
individuals against their legislatures by interpreting equal protection to
democratize the state election process in its "one-person-one-vote" re-
apportionment decisions. The Constitution did not guarantee a right to
vote. But it could, and did, require that a legislature assure that one
person's vote should be weighted equally with another's.
334
The Burger Court has confronted each of these traditional tensions.
Nation vs. state-here it has somewhat cut back from the nationalizing
response of the Warren Court.3 3 5 Court vs. legislature-here it has
generally held to the Warren Court's reluctance to intervene in social
and economic matters,336 while showing greater hesitation than its
328. Immediately following the overwhelming popular endorsement in the 1936 election, Pres-
ident Roosevelt sought to insure favorable Supreme Court rulings on the constitutionality of his
New Deal legislation by proposing legislation that would permit him to appoint additional Jus-
tices to the Supreme Court. See R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 187-91
(1941). After Congress rejected the "court packing plan," the Court showed a more hospitable
attitude to the New Deal legislation. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). Immediately thereafter, Roosevelt
had his first appointment to the Court, and other vacancies soon developed. See note 290 supra.
329. For example, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and Wickard v. Filbum, 317
U.S. 111 (1942), involved a withdrawal by the Court from its previous position of expansive state
power under the Constitution by virtue of the tenth amendment. See note 301 supra.
330. Eg., 312 U.S. 100 (1941); 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In these commerce clause cases the Court
shifted from its previous posture of substituting judicial for congressional judgment to a deferen-
tial review.
331. See Smith v. Allright, 311 U.S. 649 (1944). Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) effec-
tively eliminated the so-called "white primary."
332. See text accompanying notes 5-9 & 35 supra.
333. The development of what has been called procedural due process involved the Court's
expansion of the technique it had already employed with respect to the first amendment. See text
accompanying notes 326-27 supra.
334. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
335. See cases cited in notes 301 & 316 supra. Also relevant here is a line of cases commenc-
ing with Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) limiting federal judicial intervention in state court
proceedings.
336. The pivotal case is Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See text accompanying
note 32 supra.
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predecessor at intervening in voting matters.337 Individual vs. govern-
ment--the new individual rights identified by the Warren Court have,
in general, been retained but not extended,33 with the obvious excep-
tion of the abortion case. 339 Black vs. white-here the Burger Court
has faced its most severe challenge. The problem of racial discrimina-
tion is no longer the simple black vs. white of earlier days, but affects
other identifiable minorities who are subjected to comparable discrimi-
nation.3" And two new major tensions have presented themselves:
male vs. female and present vs. future generations. The Warren Court,
like its predecessors,341 had been content with a most deferential review
of alleged discrimination against women. 342  The Burger Court has
faced an onslaught of cases seeking constitutional bars to gender
stereotypes of the past, with remedial compensation. 343  Barely per-
ceived as yet is this second new tension in the area of constitutional
policy: the claim for consideration of the effect of a particular constitu-
tional decision (or trend) on future generations, on the nation of the
future as well as on the nation of the present.34
2. Fundamental Ideas
Constitutional morality345 is deeply concerned with certain leading
337. Even Justice Harlan, who had opposed the equal protection vote decisions, see cases cited
in note 247 supra, thought it odd that the Court declined to extend these cases to disallow multi-
member districts. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 165, 167 (1971). And the Burger Court
early showed greater tolerance of deviation from one-person-one-vote standard of equality. Ma-
han v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
338. The Burger Court made a sharp turn in the first amendment obscenity cases in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). But even Justice Brennan, a dominant figure in the Warren Court
approach that Miller rejected, conceded that some change was in order. Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-74 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Reports of the impending death of two prominent Warren Court decisions-the exclusionary
rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and the custody warnings of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966)--proved exaggerated. Each was curtailed, but neither overruled. And in a sur-
prising 1981 decision, Edwards v. Arizona, 101 S. Ct. 188 (1981), the scope of Miranda was even
slightly extended.
339. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The case may prove to be the Achilles heel of the
Burger Court. See text accompanying notes 410-30 M/ra.
Another exception is with respect to habeas corpus, where Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977) cut severely into Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
340. See text accompanying notes 68 & 310 supra.
341. A highly deferential gender case of the Roosevelt Court, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948), was finally given a decent burial in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976).
342. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
343. See text accompanying notes 75-77 supra.
344. Although the seed was present in Chief Justice Marshall's "constitution intended to en-
dure for ages to come," see text accompanying notes 360-62 infra, the Court has yet to give explicit
attention to this tension. Professor John Rawls defines this as the question of "how far the present
generation is bound to respect the claims of its successors." J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 284
(1971).
345. I am using the term "constitutional morality" to include the major tensions (discussed at
pp. 355-60 supra), the leading, or fundamental, ideas (developed here), and the factors of an ac-
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ideas which have been identified as fundamental to the constitutional
society.346 In the United States of 1981 these certainly include: equal-
ity of opportunity rooted in "equal protection of the laws" of the four-
teenth amendment and the "pursuit of happiness" of the Declaration of
Independence; 341 personal liberty qualified by the requirements of pub-
lic order;348 procedural justice, particularly in matters where govern-
mental power faces the individual; 4 9  free expression and
association;350 separation of organized religion from government;
35'
and the right of persons to participate equally and fairly as voters and
as candidates for public elective office. 352 Other leading ideas may
fairly be suggested,3 53 but these will do for now. The specifics of these
fundamental ideas have been gradually spelled out in particular judi-
cial decisions, some of which found leading ideas in conflict with each
other.35 4 These fundamental ideas represent the foundation of justice
in American constitutional society.355
3. Factors of Constitutional Process
Since constitutional adjudication is by its nature judicial, it is of the
cepted process (discussed at pp. 361-69 infra), all of which give guidance to constitutional deci-
sionmaking.
346. The Court has had difficulty in agreeing as to the grounds upon which it identifies a right
as "fundamental." As to due process, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (whether
the right is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice"). As to equal protection, see San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (whether a right is "ex-
plicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution").
347. While the Declaration of Independence is obviously not a part of the Constitution, the
suggestion here is that it is legitimate to consider it in searching for the "leading ideas" of Ameri-
can society, particularly where a provision is reinforced by constitutional experience.
348. Justice Cardozo, in a phrase long used as a standard by the Supreme Court, referred to
the constitutional system as a "scheme of ordered libery." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937).
349. See text accompanying note 337 supra.
350. See text accompanying note 327 supra.
351. Id
352. See text accompanying notes 55-57 & 334 supra.
353. Examples are: the idea of universal popular suffrage of national representatives (seven-
teenth amendment concerning senators), nineteenth amendment, extending suffrage to women;
the anti-vote dilution cases commencing with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); the idea of full
employment; the idea of collective bargaining; and the idea of economic security for senior citi-
zens. In this analysis an idea does not become a "leading" or "fundamental" idea of the society
simply by the enactment of particular legislation, but by the continuing acceptance of the idea by
a succession of generations. Nor is it required that the idea be the result of a constitutional initia-
tive. Where it results from statute it may be repealed; where it results from court decision it may
be overruled by subsequent decision or by amendment. But until then it is relevant to constitu-
tional decisionmaking.
354. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (freedom of the press vs. right to
a fair trial). See text accompanying note 544 infra.
355. The notion of leading or fundamental ideas is further developed at text accompanying
notes 419, 439, & 565-76 mfra.
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essence of constitutional morality3 56 that the Court consider the ten-
sions and the fundamental ideas in light of an accepted constitutional
judicial process. Ten factors have special relevance here.
(1) Remedy
American constitutional law early underscored one of the basic com-
mon law canons of adjudication-that a judicial remedy be afforded
once a right has been established, ubijus, ibi remedium, whether the
right be to a benefit or to compensation for an injury.357 An impressive
array of decisions by the Burger Court has given renewed meaning to
this traditional judicial concern, in a constitutional context.358
A question of acute present concern is the constitutional viability of a
legislative, executive, or administrative remedy given to one person or
group which impinges on the asserted right of another person or group.
In a sense it is the classic problem of equal protection highlighted by
the current thrusts for affirmative action.
(2) Coherent Articulation
Like all judicial determinations in the common law tradition, consti-
tutional opinions are expected to be reasoned justifications leading to
the conclusion reached in a particular case. Like common law judges,
constitutional jurists in the course of deciding a case often elaborate
and extend or confine the law itself. What is special about constitu-
tional decision-making is that the text which they elaborate is often so
spare-"commerce among the several states," "due process," ". equal
protection of the laws," "case . . . or controversy"-hat the over-
whelming proportion of constitutional law is made up of the content of
the judicial opinions. One other factor marks constitutional opinions
from run-of-the-mill judicial handiwork-they must have not only the
internal coherence of a judicial opinion, but also be coherent with the
Court's elaboration of other parts of the Constitution.359 In all this,
356. See note 345 supra.
357. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). "The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection." Id at 163.
Then, citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, Chief Justice Marshall continued: "where there
is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is evaded."
5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 163.
358. A judicial remedy was supplied for violation of a constitutional right in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth amendment), Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228 (1979) (fifth amendment), and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (eighth amendment).
359. For example, consider the disagreement within the Warren Court concerning different
standards for due process when applied to the states under the fourteenth amendment and when
applied to the federal government under the fifth amendment. The view ultimately prevailed that
it was incoherent to have two distinct standards for due process. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964). But Justice Harlan, and those agreeing with him, did not consider a two-standard due
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constitutional decision-making is distinct from piecemeal, unreasoned
legislative enactment.
(3) Constitutional Development
In McCulloch v. Maryland 6' in 1819 Chief Justice Marshall, in his
most quoted phrase, said, "[W]e must never forget that it is a constitu-
tion we are expounding."36' He noted that it was "a constitution in-
tended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to
the various crises of human affairs. ' 362 Add to these insights his earlier
postulate in Marbury v. Madison: "It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" and, when ap-
propriate, to declare "that a law repugnant to the constitution is
void. .... "363 Ever since these landmark utterances the Supreme
Court has presided, sometimes wisely and sometimes not, over the de-
velopment of the Constitution.364
(4) Stare Decisis
The doctrine of adherence to precedent has been a general rule of
process an example of incoherence. Rather, they felt, it was coherent with the basic constitutional
notion of federalism. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496, 503 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing in Roth, concurring in Aiberts). In one limited area, through Justice Powell, the Harlan view
(previously sponsored by Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter) has had a mini-revival. See Apodaca
v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 414 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (non-unanimous jury verdicts permit-
ted in state trials, but rejected in dictum as to federal trials).
360. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
361. Id at 407.
362. Id at 415.
363. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 180 (1803).
364. In the 162 years since McCulioch v. Maryland there have been only fourteen infusions by
constitutional amendment (and two of these cancelled each other out--the eighteenth and twenty
first amendments). From 1791, when the first ten amendments were adopted, to the present day
only one truly significant set of amendments can be identified-the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments adopted in 1865-1870. See notes 317-19 supra.
Recall two classic reaffirmations of the notion of constitutional development. Speaking in refer-
ence to the treaty-making power in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), Justice Holmes
said:
[WIhen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the
United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of begetters. It was enough
for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and
has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case
before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of
what was said a hundred years ago.
This was echoed by Chief Justice Hughes in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 442-43 (1934):
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a century ago, or to insist
that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the
vision of our time. If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its
adoption it means today, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must
be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their
time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation.
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judicial decision-making in the common law system. Both from the
standpoint of judicial economy (to avoid repeated reconsiderations of
the same point) and from the standpoint of public reliance on what the
law is, the courts early proclaimed themselves subject to stare decisis (to
adhere to matters decided). Stare decisis has been a part of the consti-
tutional decision-making process although not as rigidly adhered to
there as in ordinary litigation.365 As Justice Stevens has recently noted,
stare decisis is more at home in constitutional law with respect to past
decisions that were arguably correct when made, and remain arguably
so, than with decisions that are overshadowed by subsequent develop-
ments that justify a change in the constitutional policy that underlies
them.366
(5) Quasi-Legislative Effect
Common law judicial decisions often have the effect of stating or
elaborating rules of law. When a common law decision pronounces a
new legal rule, that new rule has traditionally been applied to that
case. 367 Sometimes this was explained in metaphysical terms-that the
common law has an independent, almost eternal, existence, and that a
judge announcing a "new" rule was simply "finding" the common law
that was there all the time. Hence, the explanation went, it was not
unfair to hold the losing party to the rule's liabilities in the case first
announcing the new rule. Practically speaking, then, the new common
law rule had a retroactive effect.368 Under the traditional view that a
judicial decision merely declared, or found, the law, and did not make
it, problems arose in constitutional law when prior decisions were over-
ruled. The claim could be made that the new (overruling) constitu-
tional rule had always been the "law," and that those convicted without
its benefit must be given a new trial. The specter of emptying the pris-.
ons was cited to restrain overruling of past constitutional decisions.
The effect was to inhibit constitutional development and correction of
error.
In Linkletter v. Walker 369 the Court stated that under specified con-
ditions the Court, in announcing a new constitutional rule, could give
365. See CARDOZO, supra note 286, at 17 & 71.
366. See text accompanying note 173 supra. Justice Powell has noted the interplay of stare
decisis and the minimum coherence requirement of a single majority opinion. See note 166 supra.
367. Cardozo used for his example the classic negligence case of MacPherson v. Buick Co.,
217 N.Y. 382 (1916). CARDOZO, supra note 286, at 146.
368. "[I]n the vast majority of cases the retrospective effect of judge-made law is felt either to
involve no hardship or only such hardship as is inevitable where no rule has been declared."
CARDOZO, supra note 286, at 146. Such justification, however, would not satisfy the situation in
which an earlier rule was overruled in the subsequent case. In that event Cardozo recommends
merely prospective overruling and cites some courts which have taken this course. Id at 147.
369. 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
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it, like legislation, merely prospective effect. The Linkletter develop-
ment thus made explicit that constitutional rules could have a pecu-
liarly quasi-legislative effect. The new doctrine, while sharply
criticized,37 ° has become firm37' and has given the Court greater flex-
ibility in departing from its precedents.372
(6) Judicial Oversight
There are two aspects to judicial oversight by the Supreme Court.
First, apart from its constitutional concerns, the Supreme Court func-
tions as the highest court of the federal system, much as the highest
court of a state presides over a state legal system.373 For example, in
matters of taxation and labor relations the Supreme Court, like a high-
est state court, gives the final interpretation to federal statutes which
govern these areas. Second, the Supreme Court's oversight in constitu-
tional law, which concerns us here, is carried out by formulation of
constitutional rules or standards. 374  The lower federal and state
375
courts then apply these rules or standards to new cases, and the Court
oversees this application through its selection of cases for its review.
3 76
Because of the limited exercise of Supreme Court review, these lower
court determinations are usually conclusive for litigants. In areas of
emerging law the Court is more likely to bring up cases for its full
consideration. But even here it often bides its time for exercising cor-
rective oversight.377
370. Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 224 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
371. The current formulation of the Linkletter doctrine is contained in Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967), which specifies the criteria used to determine whether a new constitutional rule
should be retroactive or merely prospective in effect: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new
standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and
(c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."
Id at 297.
372. The factors outlined in Stovall suggest that overruling unsatisfactory constitutional prece-
dent creates difficulties. These may be satisfied by opting for a merely prospective overruling.
373. Federal cases ordinarily reach the Supreme Court by direct review of the courts of ap-
peal, under appellate jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976). There is only limited scope to
direct review from three-judge district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2284 since its amendment in 1976.
374. The special problem of standards is dealt with under the next heading.
375. The Supreme Court may review decisions of the highest applicable state court, as to
controlling federal questions, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). Like review from the federal
courts, this state jurisdictional statute provides both for obligatory review by appeal and for dis-
cretionary review by certiorari.
376. With respect to review by certiorari the Supreme Court has total discretion. As to the
obligatory appeals the Court has established doctrines by which it dismisses appeals for "want of a
substantial federal question," and decides other appeals summarily without briefs or oral argu-
ment. See notes 387-88 infra.
377. See discussion of Minnick v. California Dep't of Correction, 101 S. Ct. 2211 (1981) at text
accompanying notes 501-05 infra.
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(7) Constitutional Standards
A familiar (almost necessary) tool of the Supreme Court in applying
such indefinite clauses of the Constitution as "due process" and "equal
protection" has been to develop certain constitutional standards, or
tests, or formulas for dealing with constitutional cases. The Supreme
Court leaves to the lower courts the task of applying the formulas to the
facts of specific cases, and then selectively reviews occasional lower
court cases which seem to violate its standard or to call for a new re-
finement. There is need to formulate standards that may be readily,
intelligibly, and consistently applied by lower courts.3 78 There is also
need to avoid standards that are subject to possible misuse that would
invidiously impinge upon protected constitutional interests.
(8) Constitutional Realism
Two different varieties of constitutional realism have characterized
constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court. First is a disincli-
nation to assume as the basis for decision an ideal that perhaps ulti-
mately should be achieved, or accepted, but is not ripe as yet for the
society of today. In the first death penalty case, Furman v. Georgia,379
several Justices were persuaded that "evolving standards of decency" in
the society had reached the stage where the death penalty should be
considered in violation of due process as a "cruel and unusual punish-
ment. ' 38 0 A majority of the Court reversed the convictions in Furman
and its companion cases, but on much more modest grounds.38' Subse-
quent events-reinstitution of the death penalty in states which had
lately abolished it, and a reswing towards the death penalty in public
opinion polls-verified the Court's hunch that, however edifying, con-
stitutional abolition was not in the cards for now.
The second aspect of constitutional realism is the Court's concern
that the gap between its decisions and their public acceptability not be
so great as to seriously impede their enforcement or to impair public
respect for the Court as an institution.38 2 Its occasional excessive con-
cern with this gap has been immortalized by Mr. Dooley's quip: "The
Supreme Court follows the election returns.
38s3
378. See note 259 supra.
379. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
380. Id at 241-375.
381. Id at 240.
382. See C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50-54 (1928). Hughes
referred to three cases as the Court's "self-inflicted wounds": Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1857); Hepburn v. Griswold, 76 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870); and the Income Tax Cases,
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
383. "[Tlhere's wan thing I'm sure about .... That is, ... th' supreme court follows th'
election returns." F. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW 52 (E. Bander, ed. 1963).
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(9) Constitutional Responsibility
A counterpoise to that aspect of realism that cautions the Court
against prematurely embracing ideal aspirations is the Court's respon-
sibility to advance rather than obstruct the contemporary society in its
more noble aspirations to constitutional justice.
The second aspect of constitutional realism is tempered by the
Court's awareness of its responsibility as the developing and enforcing
organ of the Constitution, especially of provisions that safeguard indi-
vidual rights and interests against majority rule, even when the major-
ity speaks by legislation. Perhaps Mr. Dooley would have been shaken
or stirred by the constitutional decisions of the Warren Court in racial
and criminal justice matters, far in advance of, if not directly counter
to, majority public opinion." The Brown era decisions certainly
helped mold public opinion, rather than meekly following it.385
(10) Fencing Out
A much disputed, but commonplace factor of constitutional process
is the array of techniques available to the Court to avoid, or to post-
pone, decisions on constitutional questions. The most obvious one de-
rives from the Court's almost total control over its own docket. The
Court has discretion to grant or to refuse a writ of certiorari to review
state or lower federal courts. 86 Even where, by statute, appeal is of
right, the Court has formulated discretionary doctrines to dispose of an
appeal summarily, or to set it down for full consideration and written
decision after briefs and oral argument. 87 And after certiorari has
been granted, and after an appeal has been briefed and argued, the
Court retains authority to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted or
dismiss or affirm an appeal without opinion.388
The mootness and standing doctrines are also used to fence out con-
384. The unpopularity of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) is recalled by Justice
Douglas in his autobiography, THE COURT YEARs at 113, 219-30, & 137 (1980).
385. See Broderick, PreferentialAdmisrsions and the Brown Heritage, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 123,
136-44, 152-56 (1977).
386. "[A]lI that a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari means is that fewer than four
members of the Court thought it should be granted .... [Sluch a denial carries with it no impli-
cation whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has declined to
review." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
opinion respecting denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
387. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947) (dismissal for want of a properly
presented federal question); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) (dismissal for want of a "substan-
tial" federal question). Both types of dismissal constitute a determination of want of appellate
jurisdiction.
388. E.g., Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974) (Miller II). Such a dismissal constitutes a
decision by the Supreme Court on the merits, and as such is binding upon lower courts. Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
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stitutional questions the Court prefers not to decide at the time
presented.
The current formulation, and erratic enforcement, of the doctrine of
mootness especially lends itself to fencing out. 389 The basic theory of
mootness is sound-not to decide cases that have, in effect, been re-
solved by the time they reach the Court. But exceptions have been
formulated so loosely as to give broad discretion to the Court to fence
out constitutional decision.390
Standing rests upon the notion that a party should have sufficient
"personal stake" in the outcome of a litigated matter to insure full, and
not indifferent or feigned, presentation of the issues. 391  The Burger
Court has attempted to add to standing an additional requirement that
implicates the prudential judgment of the Court.3 92 The Court has
lately backed off "prudential" standing,393 but "personal stake," as de-
fined by the decisions, leaves ample room for fencing out many consti-
tutional cases.394
So much for fencing out entire cases. What of fencing out constitu-
tional issues in cases that the Court is prepared to decide? It is a tradi-
tional doctrine of constitutional law that the Supreme Court (or any
federal court) should not reach a constitutional issue if the case can be
fairly decided on nonconstitutional grounds.395 Occasionally, the reach
of the Court for a statutory basis for decision leaves the distinct impres-
sion that this doctrine has been used for purposes of fencing out consti-
tutional issues. A recent example is the opinion of the Stevens Four in
Bakke396 on the basis of Title VI, when a majority of the Court (and
almost all the litigants on each side) thought an equal protection pro-
nouncement necessary to decide the case.
The Supreme Court is thus amply endowed with techniques to de-
cide when a constitutional decision should and should not be made.
389. See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
390. Note particularly the Court's exception to mootness in cases where the claim on the mer-
its is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.1 1 (1975);
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-15 (1911). Compare DeFunis v. Ode-
gaard,.416 U.S. 312 (1974) with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
391. "Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the
question of standing." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
392. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
393. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
394. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); O'Shea v. Lit-
tleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
395. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) is a recent re-
minder of this well-settled point.
396. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408 (1978). See text accompanying
note 116 supra.
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The Court often deals with the conflicting pressures of constitutional
realism and constitutional responsibility by fencing out the issue en-
tirely for a time. There is respectable opinion for the view that in fenc-
ing out the Court is performing its function dextrously, rather than
evading responsibility.397 But others disagree.398
B. Predictiveness of Constitutionality : Two Current Proposals
The preceding analysis of tensions, leading ideas, and constitutional
process factors was offered as a description of the way the constitu-
tional process actually functions. One may find the description accu-
rate without being convinced that the analysis is predictive of how the
Supreme Court will decide concrete cases. Its predictive utility will be
assessed in this and the following subsection.
399
Here I shall consider two controversial pieces of proposed congres-
sional legislation which, if passed, will certainly be measured for con-
stitutionality by the Supreme Court: the Human Life bill,' in which
Congress defines when life begins, and the bill withdrawing from the
Supreme Court, and other federal courts, jurisdiction to pass on the
constitutionality of voluntary prayers in public schools."' In different
ways these bills draw into question which governmental body has the
final word as to constitutionality in the American constitutional sys-
tem.4o
Since Marbury v. Madison in 1803 the consistent position of the
Supreme Court has been that it is the body designated by the Constitu-
tion to give the ultimate pronouncement as to the meaning of that doc-
397. The late Professor Alexander Bickel refers to this progression of devices for withholding
the ultimate constitutional judgment of the Supreme Court as "passive virtues." A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 183 (1962).
398. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 240-41, 661-62, 1629 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as HART & WECHSLER]; Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"---a Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18 (1964).
399. Not until I shall inquire whether the analysis has "normative" value (i.e., represents an
"ought" that pushes towards how cases "should" be decided) do I confront the judicial positivists.
Even positivists find acceptable, even useful, an accurate description of the de facto functioning of
a legal system. Professor H.L.A. Hart, the most celebrated contemporary positivist, see note 523
infra, goes so far as to make a "rule of recognition specifying the ultimate criteria used in the
identification of the law an essential part of a legal system." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
113, 120 (1962). He insists that "this rule of recognition, in terms of which [one] assesses the
validity of a particular statute, is not only accepted by him but is the rule of recognition actually
accepted and employed in the general operation of the system." Id at 105. See note 523 infra.
400. S. 158 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. (S. 287, Jan. 19, 1981).
401. S. 438, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. (S. 1583, Feb. 21, 1979).
402. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981)
implies that the Court will give unusual deference to congressional decisions concerning national
defense-the raising of armies--even in the face of due process or equal protection claims. But
the Court stops short of withdrawing from any judicial review in these matters.
369
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ument.40 3 There are arguably three instances in which the Court, in
interpreting the Constitution, has conceded a certain priority to Con-
gress. The first covers those rare circumstances in which the Court has
determined a case to be beyond its constitutional jurisdiction under ar-
ticle III on the ground that it raises a "political question" and not a
"judicial one. ' '404 The second is the series of cases following Katzen-
bach v. Morgan"5 iti which the Court has recognized a certain primacy
in Congress under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The last derives from the Court's recognition of the constitu-
tional power of Congress to define the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts.' 6  In other situations," 7 the finality of the Supreme
Court's word as to constitutionality has left those dissatisfied with its
decisions to the ultimate relief of constitutional amendment, a remedy
that has been successfully availed of only four times.' °8
Of the two current congressional efforts to circumvent constitutional
decision, one employs the enforcement clause technique and the other
the device of withdrawing specific subject matter from the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. Testimony has been given, pro and con, as to the
constitutionality of each.' Obviously, considerations of constitutional
policy will be crucial should the legislation be enacted and tested in the
Supreme Court. In light of the Tensions/Fundamental Ideas/
403. "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). "So if a law be in opposition to the
constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case . . . the court must
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case." Id at 178.
404. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) the
Court established narrow ground rules for "political questions," identifying that doctrine as lim-
ited to separation of powers questions among the branches of the national government, with a
heavy emphasis upon the Court's finding "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department." 369 U.S. at 217.
405. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See text accompanying notes 79-102 supra.
406. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). As to the appellate power of the
Supreme Court see Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). See note 438 infra. With
these cases compare United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
407. Even in the above situations the Supreme Court decides whether the bar to its jurisdic-
tion exists, ie., whether there is, in fact, a political question, whether an act is within the congres-
sional power under section 5, and whether the case is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts.
408. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (18-year old voting--overruled by twenty-sixth
amendment); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (federal income tax-
overruled by sixteenth amendment); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (slav-
ery in United States territorities--overruled by the fourteenth amendment); Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. 419 (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (suit in federal courts against a state by citizen of another state or
foreign country-overruled by the eleventh amendment).
409. Cohodas, Anti-Abortion Bill Advances in Senate Panel, 39 CONG. Q. 1253 (1981);
Cohodas, Members Move to Rein in Supreme Court, 39 CONG. Q. 947 (1981); Cohodas, Opponents
Take Momentum from Legislation Designed to Return Prayer to Schools, 38 CONG. Q. 1966(1980).
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Constitutional Factors analysis, how would the Court appraise their
constitutionality?
The Human Life Bill
In its controversial 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade,"'0 the Supreme
Court identified as "fundamental" the right of a woman to elect to have
an abortion. En route to its conclusion, Justice Blackmun's opinion for
the Court considered the argument that a fetus was a "person" within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. He conceded that "[ilf this
suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's [woman plain-
tiff] case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be
guaranteed specifically by the Amendment." '' However, he con-
cluded that "the unborn have never been recognized in law as persons
in the whole sense"4 2 and denied that "by adopting one theory of life,
Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at
stake.
413
The pending human life bill, by defining that life begins at concep-
tion, purports to confer the status of "person" which would entitle the
fetus to the protection of the fourteenth amendment under Justice
Blackmun's concession in Roe. The bill is, of course, designed to
"override the rights of the pregnant woman" 414 as established in the
Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade.
The constitutional ground relied on by proponents of the bill is the
second arm of Justice Brennan's opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan
4l5
that Congress might redefine the substantive content of the fourteenth
amendment-without his admonition in that opinion that section 5
"grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guaran-
tees"4 6 of due process and equal protection. The Court's subsequent
pronouncements on this question have been discussed above.4 7 While
suggestive, they are not totally dispositive. How is the Supreme Court
likely to resolve this constitutional question in light of the threefold
analysis recommended above?
1. Tensions
While several of the tensions are obviously involved in this legisla-
tion, the crucial one, in the context of section 5, is between the courts
410. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
411. Id at 156-57.
412. Id at 162.
413. Id
414. Id
415. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See text accompanying notes 86-92 supra.
416. 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
417. See text accompanying notes 93-102 supra.
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and the legislature."' If this bill should be found constitutional, re-
sponsibility for the ultimate determination of the content of significant
constitutional rights would obviously pass from the courts to the Con-
gress.
2. Fundamental Ideas
In view of the recency of the Court's determination in Roe v. Wade
and the bitter division in the nation that it has provoked, it presses
credulity to the extreme to characterize the right of a woman to choose
an abortion as a "fundamental idea" of the society. Undoubtedly this
consideration gives appeal to the extraordinary resort to congressional
"repeal" of the "right.-4 19 But it also heightens the significance of the
factors of "process" integral to constitutional morality.
3. Constitutional Process
(1) Remedy
Although the bill purports to cancel the remedy, since it is addressed
to cancellation of the right itself, this element is not directly in-
volved a2 o
(2) Coherence
Quite obviously, if Congress is free to pick and choose among those
rights identified by the Supreme Court as "fundamental," the prospect
of a coherent fabric of rights is diminished. When the Court identifies
a "fundamental right" it is forced to justify its conclusion with reasons
that are coherent with other determinations. However unsatisfactory
the Court's handiwork in a particular area,42' Congress would be con-
trolled by no comparable responsibility of coherent articulation.
(3) Constitutional Development
For the same reasons, the legislature is hardly the organ to assume
responsibility for reasoned constitutional development.422 One might
418. More specifically, the tension is between Congress and the Supreme Court. Indirectly
involved, of course, is the tension between the individual affected and his state government.
419. Consider here the floodgate argument of Justice Harlan in his Katzenbach v. Morgan
dissent:
In effect the Court reads § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as giving Congress the power to
define the substantive scope of the Amendment. If that indeed be the true reach of § 5, then I
do not see why Congress should not be able as well to exercise its § 5 "discretion" by enacting
statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court.
384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966). Recall Justice Brennan's rejection of this point. Id at 651 n.10.
420. If there is no right there is no need for a remedy. Vbi us, ibi remedium, in reverse. See
text accompanying note 357 supra.
421. See text accompanying notes 36-68 supra.
422. While a legislature may occasionally deal coherently with the reform of an entire area of
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respond that Congress' sortie here is simply, as in Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan ,423 one of occasional repair. Still, once Congress' power to sub-
tract from rights identified by the Supreme Court is conceded, there is
no apparent basis to stem a flood-tide of ad hoc congressional revision
of constitutional rights that are publicly unpopular.424 This is the legis-
lature's role in many legal systems, England for example, but it falls
short of constitutional government as understood in the United States
since Marbury v. Madison.
(4) Stare Decisis
Again, the factor of stability in the law which this judicial factor fos-
ters would be attenuated. Still, in some periods the stare decisis doc-
trine has been used to excess in arresting constitutional change. 25
(5) Quasi-Legislative Effect
The contrast here is between an authoritative legislative rule, which
is readily subject to revision or repeal, and a constitutional rule pro-
nounced by the Supreme Court with, at most, quasi-legislative effect as
I have defined it. Since an ill-considered legislative rule is more easily
rectified than a judicial one, the advantage here might be on the side of
congressional action.426
(6) Constitutional Standards
Beyond objections cited in the categories considered above there is
little to choose here between Congress and the Court. The preliminary
establishment of standards by Congress has been found satisfactory in
the context of administrative law.
law, with the assistance of professional committees (as with the federal rules of procedure and
evidence, the Administrative Procedure Act, and various state codes), its normal functioning is
dealing ad hoc with particular problems of immediate public concern.
423. See text accompanying notes 80-82 supra.
424. Recall Congress' partial revision of the custodial interrogation safeguards laid down by
the Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) in Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control
Act of 1968. Burt, The Miranda and Title 11: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81.
425. A conviction that the Supreme Court was in such a phase in early New Deal days
prompted President Roosevelt to propose his 1937 court packing plan. See note 328 supra.
426. A direct overruling of an unsatisfactory constitutional decision is tidy and clean cut.
Since Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the overruling decision need not have retroactive
effect. However, outright reversal is rare, and the spectacle of the Court retreating less forthrightly
is not edifying. Examples of such retreats by the Burger Court include Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) to Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (abortion rights and their consequences); from
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) to Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (alienage
as a "suspect classification" for equal protection); from Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 59 (1975) to
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (the addition of
"prudential considerations" to article III "personal stake" requirements for standing). For a rare
example of outright overruling by the Court of its recent constitutional decisions, see West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (second flag salute case).
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(7) Judicial Oversight
This concern would be slight. If this legislation were held constitu-
tional the Supreme Court would oversee its enforcement in the federal
and state courts. However, the Court's control over interpretation and
application of a statute is far less than oversight of its own decisions,
which it may revise or overrule.427
(8) Constitutional Realism
(9) Constitutional Responsibility
In the peculiar context of the Court's abortion decision in Roe v.
Wade,428 which has sparked an eight-year long war between fairly
equally divided and equally determined groups opposing and favoring
abortion, an argument that the Court's abortion decision was unrealis-
tic has some appeal. But equally unrealistic would be confidence that,
given this precedent, other constitutional liberties would be invulnera-
ble to popular disapproval.429
(10) Fencing Out
Awareness of a specific case's posture is advisable before risking even
most general predictions as to fencing out. This proposed legislation is
built upon framework erected by the Court itself, the Katzenbach v.
Morgan "substantive" ground formula, and it is directed to undermin-
ing a recent major decision of the Court that defined personal constitu-
tional rights. While the Court itself has lately dulled the equal
protection implications of its abortion decision,43 ° it has shown no dis-
position to overrule it, much less to submit passively to its nullification
by Congress. Consequently, it is unlikely that the Court would allow
the proposed legislation to survive without reaching the merits.
The School Prayer Bill
One of the most controversial decisions of the Supreme Court in the
Warren era was Engel v. Vitale,43 ' in which the Court held that a New
York statute prescribing a nondenominational prayer for recitation in
state public schools was in violation of the establishment clause of the
first amendment. Although disagreement with the decision was not
427. The implications of upholding this bill would be that Congress would have power to
revise constitutional decisions dealing with individual rights. This is different in kind from the
Court permitting Congress to accord more power to the states than the Court's decisions under the
commerce clause had allowed. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
428. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
429. See note 416 supra.
430. See Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
431. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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universal among organized religious groups, in 1979 Senator Jesse
Helms of North Carolina introduced a bill, since annexed to other pro-
posed legislation, that sought to counter the effect of the school prayer
decision.432 The technique employed by the Helms amendment is to
bar Supreme Court jurisdiction to review "any case arising out of any
state statute (which) relates to voluntary prayers" in public schools, and
to withdraw from federal district court jurisdiction "any case or ques-
tion" which the amendment denies the Supreme Court jurisdiction to
review. The effect is to give finality to the state court's interpretation of
the Constitution on the matter.
Using the rationale of the power of Congress over the jurisdiction of
federal courts,433 the Helms amendment seeks to nullify the practical
effect of Engel v. Vitale. Should the amendment be passed, there is
Supreme Court precedent that arguably could justify a decision either
way as to the constitutionality of the amendment.434 The argument in
support of Congress' power to withdraw particular subject matter from
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts seems stronger than that
which would withdraw from the Supreme Court all power to review an
allegedly unconstitutional state court decision. 43 5 At any event, Con-
gress' power to withdraw from all federal courts the right to pass on
constitutional rights denied by the states is untested.436 Since the
Supreme Court's answer will not be found in clear text or precedent,
again it will sound in the domain of constitutional policy. How would
the analysis we have been considering bear upon its decision?
1. Tensions
Once again, the predominant tension here is that between Congress
and the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution.
437
In the context of jurisdiction it seems that Congress' power is at its
peak. For article III of the Constitution gave Congress the option
whether or not to establish lower federal courts at all. And although
the Supreme Court was established by the Constitution itself, article III
432. S. 438, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. (S. 1583, Feb. i 1, 1979).
433. See note 406 supra.
434. See notes 406 supra & 438 infra.
435. From the time of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816), it has been
understood that Supreme Court jurisdiction over constitutional issues originating in state courts is
a function of the supremacy clause of article VI and is "supported by the letter and spirit of the
constitution." 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) at 340.
436. No prior legislation sought to deprive both the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts of jurisdiction to pass on alleged infringement of constitutional rights.
437. Also involved here is the nation vs. state tension, practical finality in interpreting provi-
sions of the Constitution being left to state courts. The government vs. individual tension is not
directly involved since, in theory, the individual's right remains, although it will be enforced by a
state rather than a federal court.
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gave Congress the power to make exceptions from its appellate jurisdic-
tion.438
2. Fundamental Ideas
It is hard to generate fervor for the proposition that the right not to
have voluntary prayer in public schools is a "fundamental idea" of the
American constitutional system. As an original proposition, a nonde-
nominational prayer with voluntary participation might seem to fall
short of the "establishment of religion" barred by the first amendment.
However, the first amendment bar of establishment is itself a funda-
mental idea, and it is not seriously challenged that the Supreme Court
has asserted, without serious contradiction, the authority to define its
scope. The Helms amendment recognizes the constitutional truth of




Unlike the human life bill, the Helms school prayer amendment does
not negate the existence of a constitutional right. What is denied by the
amendment is the possibility of vindication of the constitutional inter-
est in the federal courts. It does not absolutely remove all remedy, for
it leaves open the possibility that state courts may affirm the constitu-
tional contours marked out by the Supreme Court in Engel v. Vitale. If
withdrawal of federal court access were sanctioned here, what would




These concerns for a unified concept of the Constitution under one
Supreme Court are nullified by the amendment. What this part of the
Constitution means in New York under one set of state courts it may
not mean in Kansas under another.
438. In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the
other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). See generally note 406 supra, especially Ex Parte
McCardle cited therein. Professor Henry Hart suggests that McCardle should be read so that the
exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction "must not be such as will destroy the essential role
of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan." Hart recalls that in McCardle, "the circuit
courts of the United States were still open in habeas corpus." HART AND WECHSLER, supra note
398, at 331.
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(4) Stare Decisis
To strike down this legislation as to the lower federal courts, the
Supreme Court will have to confront its cases which have given broad
recognition to congressional control of their jurisdiction.439 And, while
arguably distinguishable, Ex Parte McCardle paid impressive heed to
Congress' power to make "exceptions" to Supreme Court appellate ju-
risdiction. However, the Court has considered no legislation which
barred both inferior federal court jurisdiction and Supreme Court ap-
pellate jurisdiction, and left final word to the state courts, with respect
to enforcement of provisions of the Constitution.
(5) Quasi-Legislative Effect
This factor is inconclusive here.
(6) Constitutional Standards
(7) Judicial Oversight
Obviously there would remain neither an effective national constitu-
tional standard, nor judicial oversight by the Supreme Court on this
matter, if the amendment were held constitutional.440
(8) Constitutional Realism
The argument that the amendment leaves the Constitution, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court, intact and merely leaves its implementa-
tion to the state courts, runs afoul of the canon of constitutional
realism. Obviously, the legislation can have no other design than the
expectation that the state courts would interpret the establishment
clause more tolerantly in the matter of school prayer than had the
Supreme Court in Engel v. Vitale. l
(9) Constitutional Responsibility
Certain decisions of the 1980-81 Term" 2 may be read by some as
harbingers of the Court's imminent acceptance of a major reallocation
to Congress of the Court's function of determining the substantive con-
439. See cases cited note 443 infra.
440. When this shortfall is added to the impairment of the factors of coherence and constitu-
tional development, the result of the proposed legislation might well "destroy the essential role of
the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan." HART & WECHSLER, supra note 398, at 331. See
note 438 supra.
441. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The reasons cited against fencing out the human life bill, see text
accompanying note 430 supra, also apply here.
442. For example, Albernaz v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1137 (1981); Rostker v. Goldberg, 101
S. Ct. 2646 (1981) (see text accompanying note 272 supra); United States Postal Service v. Council
of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 101 S. Ct. 2676 (1981); Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981). See
McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981).
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tent of constitutional rights. It is predictable, however, that the Court
will not renounce its traditional ultimate responsibility in this regard
short of a constitutional amendment.
(10) Fencing Out
Although the human life bill did not seem a likely candidate for
fencing out constitutional decision, different considerations are present
here. The Court itself has recognized the strength of Congress' consti-
tutional position on control of the jurisdiction of the federal courts." 3
For this reason the Court may well strain to avoid a direct confronta-
tion with Congress here.
Summary
The suggested analysis would predict the Court's flat rejection of the
human life amendment. On grounds of constitutional realism it would
probably also reject the school prayer legislation, although it might
well fence out constitutional decision here.
C. Predictiveness II" Affirmative Action
Application of the suggested analysis is less predictive when it comes
to affirmative action. Consider what, if anything, it would have pre-
dicted in the Bakke, 4 Weber," 5 and Fullilove"6 cases, and then con-
sider how it foreshadows decision making in cases involving other
affirmative action particulars on which the Court has not yet passed.447
Bakke
1. Tensions
In Bakke44 the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause was
invoked to challenge state action--the establishment of preferential ra-
cial admissions to a state medical school on behalf of several minority
groups. Bakke involved practically all the tensions mentioned: nation
vs. state, government vs. individual, court vs. executive, present genera-
tion vs. future generation, and-with its maximum complication-the
black vs. white tension. The admissions program in Bakke was
designed to favor other minorities in addition to blacks--Asian-Ameri-
cans, and Hispanic Americans. I shall hereafter call this the black plus
443. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440
(1850). But see United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
444. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
445. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
446. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
447. See note 500 infra.
448. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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vs. white tension, in view of the additional concerns which it raises.449
2. Fundamental Ideas
The fundamental idea of the American society involved in this case
is equality of opportunity.450 The unsuccessful white applicant at the
medical school claimed that the preferential admissions program de-
nied his equal opportunity to become a physician. The Regents of the
University of California, on the other hand, claimed that the prefer-
ences were themselves designed to make realistic the opportunity of
minority groups to become physicians. In resolving this fundamental
difference of view, the Court could appropriately seek guidance in the
established factors of constitutional process.
3. Constitutional Process Factors
(1) Remedy
Plaintiff Bakke's asserted injury, and demanded remedy, was tradi-
tional. The preferential racial admissions program would cost him his
seat in medical school. A view of the preferential admissions program
as remedial would require the Court to accept that the favored minori-
ties had been injured by educational and other relevant disadvantages
inflicted on them by the society as a whole.45 ' Furthermore, the claim
of educational and other social disadvantage was one thing with respect
to black applicants; it was more questionable when applied to other
minority groups, especially the Asian-Americans who had been gener-
ally successful in securing academic admissions, even at Davis.452
(2) Coherent Articulation
The factor of coherent articulation would predict at least a majority
opinion by the Court, the minimum required for internal coherence of
a decision. Beyond that it would predict that such an opinion would be
externally coherent with rulings of the Court in comparable constitu-
tional matters. The specific question in Bakke was which equal protec-
tion standard would test the constitutionality of a preferential racial
admissions program which penalized a white applicant.453 Where di-
vergent decisional results exist in comparable areas the factor of exter-
449. See text accompanying notes 68, 310, & 340 supra.
450. More precisely, what standard shall be used to review state action that curtails the equal-
ity of opportunity to participate in the medical profession.
45 1. The record in Bakke showed no history of racial discrimination at the recently founded
medical school at Davis. 438 U.S. at 305.
452. ld at 297 n.37.
453. The lower courts in Bakke, and in the comparable Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974), accepted that the choice was between a deferential rational basis test and a strict scrutiny
compelling state interest test.
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nal coherence can hardly predict an outcome.454
Such divergence was present here. Should the equal protection test
be the strict scrutiny (compelling state interest) that is applied when a
racial classification penalizes a black citizen? Or, should the applicable
test be a deferential (rational basis) test, since the strict test was devised
expressly to counter racial prejudice against blacks and other "discrete
and insular minorities"? 415  Or, should a special intermediate test be
applicable to "benign" discrimination of any kind, for example, that
already used to test benign gender discrimination?
56
The factor of external coherence would predict some effort by the
Court to get the field in order, but it would hardly help in predicting
which direction the order would take.
(3) Constitutional Development
(4) Stare Decisis
We look to the factor of constitutional development to see if the flow
of Supreme Court decisions points in one direction rather than another,
with respect to the affirmative action issue under consideration in
Bakke. Here too there is an indecisiveness in past decisions, and both
development and stare decisis457 are uncertain factors for prediction.
Recall that the question is whether a strict, or deferential, or interme-
diate constitutional test should be applied to a benign racial preference
disadvantaging a white person. To what line of decisions do we look
for development? At least two call for attention.
The reparational line of decisions in racial matters458 since Brown v.
Board of Education419 would suggest that the "strict scrutiny" standard
454. However, considerations other than coherence may well justify one decision rather than
another in a particular case. In subsequent cases, then, coherence may properly come into play.
455. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Justice Powell's major-
ity opinion in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez seemed to accept Justice Stone's
footnote 4 as the proper standard for "suspect classification":
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional
indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerless-
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. We
thus conclude that the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any
suspect class.
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
456. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See text accompanying notes 77-78 & 105 supra.
457. Strictly, stare decisis is not applicable here. Bakke raised the very question left unan-
swered by the Court in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). See text accompanying note
109 spra. In a broad sense stare deciris may be considered to envelop the precedential value of
the lines of decision cited in notes 463-68 infra.
458. In addition to the school cases, these decisions include McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) in
the equal protection area.
459. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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had been devised in the spirit of Slaughter-House's46° recognition that
the primary function of the equal protection clause was to protect the
new black citizens from racial discrimination and in the spirit of
Brown's belated recognition that strong steps were appropriate to rem-
edy seventy-five years of governmental unfaithfulness to the constitu-
tional promise to blacks of equal protection. Following this analysis,
there would be no reason to apply the strict test to a benign racial pref-
erence that incidentally disadvantages a majority person.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has always recognized that
the equal protection clause protects "any person" against prejudicial
classifications."' And in recent years a body of equal protection law
has given "strict" protection to "any person," and not just to blacks.
4 62
Perhaps, it might be argued, this is the key to a decision suggested by
the factor of development.
In fact, neither of these possible alternatives is adequately predictive,
although each may be strongly argued as a starting point for judicial
reasoning.4"3 For the Court had expressly withheld decision on this
particular question of constitutional affirmative action in a racial con-
text.4" The line of benign discrimination cases in the gender area was
hardly dispositive.4 5 Whereas racial discrimination against blacks had
been held to be the primary target of equal protection relief,46 6 sexual
discrimination was a much later arrival on the equal protection scene
and was tested by a less strict constitutional standard."67
460. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
461. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (the equal protection clause sustained relief
to Chinese laundrymen who had been discriminated against on racial grounds); Ex Parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880) (dictum); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (dictum).
462. The equal protection vote dilution cases, starting with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
protect "any person." See text accompanying note 334 supra. It should be recalled that the pre-
cise question here is not the applicability of "equal protection" to "any person", which all con-
cede, but the appropriate standard of review. And in this connection the recent majority opinion
in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) was given some credibil-
ity by the litigants in Bakke.
463. 1 argued for the reparational alternative in an article in this journal while Bakke was sub
judice. Broderick, PreferentialAdmissions and the Brown Heritage, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 123, 138-57
(1977). Justice Powell rejected this approach and opted for the "any person" starting point in his
crucial solo opinion in Bakke. See text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.
464. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
465. Onf v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See text accompa-
nying notes 104-05 supra.
466. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
467. See text accompanying notes 49-72 supra.
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None of these factors are predictive of Bakke, for the reasons just
discussed.
(8) Constitutional Realism
Each of the two suggested elements of constitutional realism 46 bears
inspection with respect to the predictability of the Court's decision.
The Court is reluctant to rest decision upon constitutional ideals that
are beyond present reach. Only twenty-three years after Brown, with
the promises of the Civil War Amendments still unfulfilled, it was un-
likely that the Court would rest its decision in Bakke on the premise of
a colorblind Constitution,469 though briefs filed in the case urged the
Court to do so.
The Court's attentiveness to strong popular sentiment, the Mr.
Dooley syndrome, raised serious concerns bearing on predictability as
the time for decision approached with consistent public opinion regis-
tering in favor of Bakke's position.
(9) Constitutional Responsibility
(10) Fencing Out.
The persuasiveness of these factors in Bakke varies depending on the
precise time at which one used them as a basis for prediction. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bakke on the same day on which
it decided United Jewish Organizations v. Carey.470 It then seemed that,
after avoiding the preferential racial admissions issue three years ear-
lier in DeFunis, the Court was prepared to decide this significant con-
stitutional aspect of affirmative action. 47' However, at the time of
argument, after the heavy register of public support for Bakke's posi-
tion,471a the Court might well have been expected to grasp at straws to
avoid reaching the constitutional issue.
468. See text accompanying notes 379-83 supra.
469. The term derives from the dissenting opinion of the first Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Fer-
guson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
470. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
471. As Professor Gunther points out, UJO "gave rise to some speculation that the Court was
willing to apply deferential review to benign racial classifications." G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 813 n.17 (10th ed. 1980).
47 Ia. New York Times, Nov. 2, 1977, 18:2 (N.Y. Times-CBS poll).
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Summary
Consideration of the elements of the suggested analysis yielded no
basis for prediction of the Bakke outcome. It did, however, illuminate
that the Court was at a crucial constitutional watershed, and suggest
that the Court might remain cautious, hesitant to move definitively in
one direction-broadly upholding remedial racial affirmative action-
rather than the other-wiping out racial preferences in their entirety.
In result, the Court seemed to heed the public pressure aspect of con-
stitutional realism, while stopping short of unrealistic colorblindness.
One understands better the relieved sigh of Professor Tribe.
47 2
Weber
Strictly speaking, United Steelworkers v. Weber,47 3 not being a con-
stitutional decision, does not fit into the analysis I have been sug-
gesting. With that caveat it is of some interest to inquire how
predictive the analysis is of the Court's majority opinion.
1. Tensions
Since this is a private action by an employee against his employer
and his union, none of the governmental tensions are applicable. The
most obvious tension here is the black vs. white tension, uncompli-
cated, it seems, with the favoring of non-black minority groups.474 In
addition, the present generation vs. future generation tension is rele-
vant. In the Gramercy, Louisiana area where the Weber case arose,
black participation in advanced craft jobs in the construction trade was
almost nil (1.83%), despite the fact that thirty-nine percent of the work
force was black.475 The management and union had agreed that with-
out the preferential craft training program the prospects of significant
black participation in future generations were also nil.
476
2. Fundamental Ideas
As in Bakke, the fundamental idea was equal opportunity-here
equal opportunity to secure a high grade of employment in a manufac-
turing plant in a rather confined geographical area.
472. See note 286 supra.
473. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
474. Id at 197.
475. Id at 198-99.
476. Id at 198.
64
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 [1981], Art. 10
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol12/iss2/10
384 NORTH CAROLINA CENTR4L LAW JOURNAL
3. Constitutional Process Factors
(1) Remedy
Plaintiff Weber's remedy--to enjoin enforcement of the private ra-
cial preference program-would depend entirely upon construction of
a specific provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that
allegedly barred even voluntary use of racial preference.477 In defend-
ing the preference the contracting parties--employer and union-had
to bring their program within the protection of affirmative action (the
only possibility left open by McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail).478 To do this
required that the program be in some sense remedial. But in precisely
what sense?479 That, at least, was unpredictable.
(2) Coherence
Even considering the minimal expectation of internal coherence, a
majority opinion was by no means predictable in Weber. Only seven
Justices were present at the oral argument before the Court. The re-
duced number was particularly significant in view of the Court's sharp
division on affirmative action in Bakke.
Although Weber, as a private, statutory case, would not be directly
controlled by Bakke, the consideration of external coherence made it
predictable that Bakke's limitations as to remedy would be relevant.480
(3) Development
In a difficult question of statutory interpretation, where legislative
text and history are inconclusive, the Court has been wont to interpret a
statute in the setting of constitutional and statutory policy. 48 ' In the
477. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976):
Nothing in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer. . . to grant prefer-
ential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex or
national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin. . . admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program,
in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in any community, State, section or other area, or in the available work
force in any community, State, section, or other area.
For a fuller discussion of Weber, including the pertinence of two other sections of Title VII,
§ 703(a) and § 703(d), see Broderick, Bakke, Weber andMr. Justice Stewart: Constitutional Theory
and Affirmative Action, II N.C. CENT. L.J. 3, 57-68 (1979).
478. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). McDonald held that Title VII's ban on racial discrimination in
employment applied to discrimination against whites, as well as against blacks and other minori-
ties; however, the Court's opinion expressly reserved the question of affirmative action ("benign
discrimination"). Id at 281 n.8.
479. Remedial of discrimination in a particular plant? Or, something less, remedial of some
form of societal discrimination? The latter view lacked majority support in Bakke. See text ac-
companying notes 115-19 supra & note 483 infra.
480. See note 479 supra.
481. The classic case often cited for the search for the "spirit" of a statute is Holy Trinity
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context of Bakke, we reviewed the diverse inferences that might be
drawn from development prior to that case.482 Did the Bakke decision
supply better focus to development, so as to help predict the outcome of
Weber? In one sense it did, in leaving open the possibility of a reme-
dial use of race where there had been societal discrimination.483 On the
other hand, Bakke rejected a remedy that would reserve a fixed
number of places for minorities and deprive a majority applicant of a
place that would otherwise be his.
484
Especially since four members of the Court485 in Bakke had not un-
veiled their position on these contrary thrusts, the factor of develop-
ment after Bakke was hardly predictive of Weber's outcome.
(4) Stare Decisis
Since the question to be decided in Weber has been expressly left
open in McDonald,486 stare decisis is not helpful here.
(5) Quasi-Legislative Effect
Since Weber involved simply a construction of a congressional stat-
ute, which Congress could change by simple amendment, the factor of
quasi-legislative effect has no bearing on the predictability of Weber.
(6) Standards
McDonald left open the question of what affirmative action remedy
was available under Title VII. The answer was not predictable from
previous standards, constitutional or otherwise. And, of course, consti-
tutional standards (such as they were) 487 did not apply to this statutory
case.
(7) Judicial Oversight
This factor has no bearing here.
(8) Constitutional Realism
The public reaction against affirmative action and the appeal of col-
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). See also NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
482. See text accompanying notes 458-67 supra.
483. In Bakke the Brennan Four had accepted societal discrimination. Justice Powell, though
obviously inhospitable, had not ruled it out, where there were proper findings. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). See text accompanying notes 115-19 supra.
484. Strictly speaking, only the solo opinion of Justice Powell did so as a matter of equal
protection. 438 U.S. at 287, 320, 421. But see text accompanying notes 171-72 supra.
485. The Stevens Four spoke only on Title VI. 438 U.S. at 408.
486. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). See note 478 supra.
487. See text accompanying notes 277-81 supra.
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orblind equality were present in Weber, as in Bakke, and would press
against upholding the affirmative action program. However, two spe-
cial notes bearing on realism are of significance to the predictability of
the decision in Weber:
(1) If a permissible affirmative action remedy must be con-
fined to plants where past racial discrimination actually oc-
curred, the possibility would disappear of any significant change
in the disproportionate lack of participation of blacks. To re-
quire as justification for a private preference the proof or admis-
sion by an employer of past racial discrimination would
diminish the likelihood of voluntary programs. For an em-
ployer would thereby open himself to damage suits for past dis-
criminations by aggrieved minorities. Furthermore, removal of
the likelihood of voluntary programs would put the full burden
of affirmative action remedial relief on the courts. This aspect
of realism would suggest the advantage of upholding a volun-
tary program, even if it is not actually predictive of Weber's re-
sult.
(2) On the other hand, Weber alleged with considerable re-
alism that the affirmative action program in his case, if volun-
tary at all, was so only in a technical sense. He contended that
the employer, in instituting the program, had responded to
strong federal pressure from the Office of Contract Compli-
ance.488 If the Supreme Court had accepted this position the
plan would not only arguably come within the specific ban of
the statutory language in Title VII,48 9 but also be subject to a
controlling constitutional ingredient, the equal protection com-
ponent of the fifth amendment.
The Court's likely handling of these issues was hardly predictable,
and it could well have gone either way.
(9) Responsibility
Since, as noted above, only seven members of the Supreme Court sat
for the Weber argument, it was not even predictable that the Court
488. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), subsequently named the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), is an arm of the Department of Labor
responsible for ensuring compliance by Government contractors with the equal employment
opportunity requirements established by Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 CFR 339 (1964-1965
Comp.), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 CFR 684 (1966-1970 Comp.), and by Exec.
Order No. 12086, 43 Fed. Reg. 4650 (1978).
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 223 n.2 (1979).
489. Title VII concededly had no statutory requirement of racial balance. The open question
was whether it banned a voluntary use of such racial balance objectives. See note 477 supra.
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would have a majority of its members writing one opinion, much less
which direction the opinion would take.
But one clue to the Court's recognition of the importance of a clear
answer in Weber was the announcement that Justice Powell, who was
ill, had received the tapes of the oral argument, and might participate
in the Court's decision.4"
However, the factor of responsibility was hardly predictable as to the
direction which a majority opinion would take, given the uncertainties
of Bakke.
(10) Fencing out
Since there was a clear basis in Weber for not reaching a constitu-
tional issue (despite the concern raised above under 8(2)), it was pre-
dictable that the case would be anchored on statutory grounds.
Summary
From the suggested analysis it was predictable that Weber would be
decided on statutory grounds, but without knowing which way. The
ambiguous wink of development from Bakke inspired no confidence
that the Court would construe the statute as it did-favorable to the
voluntary plan, with a strong reiteration by a majority of the Court of
the Brown era policy of reparation for denial of equal opportunity in
appropriate cases: "the integration of blacks into the mainstream of




The 10% set-aside for minority contracts in the 1977 congressional
public works appropriations, under equal protection challenge in Fulli-
love v. Klutznick,4 92 rubs against three sets of tensions: Court vs. Con-
gress; black plus vs. white,493 and present vs. future generations.
2. Fundamental Ideas
The fundamental idea in question is again equal opportunity-here
the equal opportunity of blacks and other specified minorities to func-
490. Justice Powell ultimately did not participate. Justice Stevens disqualified himself, pre-
sumably because one of the parties had been a client.
491. 443 U.S. at 202.
492. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
493. See text accompanying notes 310, 340, & 449 supra.
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tion effectively in the contracting business, at least with respect to shar-
ing in the allocation of public appropriations.
3. Constitutional Process Factors
(1) Remedy
In Fullilove, plaintiffs, majority contractors, did not claim that the
10% set-aside deprived them of an identified share of the public con-
tract funds. They claimed that the affirmative action provision on its
face denied them equal protection.494 Defendants supported the set-
aside on the ground that it constitutes a valid legislative remedy for
disadvantaged minorities in the construction business. The predictabil-
ity of result was obviously chancey, given the uncertainties of Bakke.
(2) Coherent Articulation
Recall that only five Justices in Bakke dealt with the constitutional
criteria for affirmative action, and that the more restrictive opinion of
Justice Powell supplied the crucial fifth vote for the Court's secondary
holding that under some circumstances race might be a permissible fac-
tor in governmental classification. Barring future clarification, the
Powell opinion constitutes our best guess as to the prevailing equal pro-
tection standard of the Court. However, as a one-Justice opinion it is a
weak predicate for affirmative action analysis. It was fairly predictable
that Fullilove would be the occasion for a majority opinion by the
Court furnishing constitutional guidance for at least some aspects of
affirmative action. What this guidance would be was less predictable,
even taking account of the Court's hospitality to certain private affirm-
ative action in Weber's statutory context.
(3) Development
The same uncertain considerations prevail which were noted in dis-
cussing the bearing of development on Bakke and Weber.
(4) Stare decisis
In Bakke the Court agreed only that there could be some use of race
as a factor in governmental classifications. But until a majority of the
Court accepts the specifics of the Powell opinion, it has no stare decisis
effect beyond this single vague point. At most it can be consulted to
predict what would be minimally required to make an affirmative ac-
494. 448 U.S. at 487. The failure of plaintiffs to particularize their alleged injury opened the
possibility of a standing infirmity. Id at 480 n. I.
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tion plan acceptable to a majority of the Court.495
(5) Quasi-Legislative Effect
The congressional legislation under review in Fullilove was limited as
to time and subject matter. It could be repealed by Congress. And
Congress, rather than the Court, assumed the primary responsibility for
the remedial character of the legislation. 96 For these reasons this fac-




In the absence of a preexisting majority constitutional formulation




These factors were no more helpful in predicting the outcome of Ful-
love than they had been in Bakke and Weber. The Court's disinclina-
tion in Bakke to face directly the issue of the constitutionality of
affirmative action raised the possibility that it would fence out a consti-
tutional decision entirely in Fullilove on standing grounds.4 97 Or, at
least, it suggested that the Court would restrict its opinion to the special
concerns of a congressionally formulated remedy for past racial dis-
crimination.498
Summary
With no previous majority constitutional opinion to draw on, there
was little basis in the analysis to predict the Fullilove result. At most,
one might have dared to predict that the case would produce a majority
opinion as to the constitutionality of affirmative action. This prediction
would have proven wrong. Alternatively, one might have ventured
that the Court would fence out the constitutional issue entirely. This,
too, would have proven wrong. Finally, one could have predicted that
495. As to other courts using Bakke in this way, see text accompanying notes 277-81 supra. As
to the Supreme Court so using it in Fullilove, see text accompanying note 156 supra.
496. As to Justice Powell's modification in FullIlove of his previous requirement in Bakke of
legislative findings of societal discrimination, see text accompanying note 159 supra.
497. Chief Justice Burger's opinion did not dismiss this possibility lightly, nor did it pursue it.
448 U.S. at 480 n.I.
498. As the Court, in fact, did in Fullilove. See text accompanying notes 155 & 157 supra.
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the Court would confine itself to pronouncements on the constitutional-
ity of a congressional remedial affirmative action plan. This is largely
what eventuated from the divided opinions of the Court in Fullilove.
Perhaps there was more: cautions by the Court that its tolerance of
affirmative action had reached outer limits. 499 But still no authoritative
majority opinion expressed this view.
What light does the suggested analysis give as to the likely resolution
of aspects of affirmative action that remain?5" Consider the following
"hypothetical" cases.
Case A
Assume that a municipal police or fire department adopts a hiring
and promotion program whose stated purpose is to increase the per-
centage of woman employees to equal their percentage in the munici-
pal labor force, and to increase minority employees (blacks and
Hispanic-Americans) to a level equalling at least 70% of the two minor-
ity groups' representation in the city's labor force. The municipality
denies that there has been past sex or racial discrimination in the de-
partments, and identifies the object of the plan as improving communi-
cations and rapport between the public and the police and fire officials
by making the representation of the two public services more in line
with their percentage representation in the local population. Plaintiffs,
white male applicants who would have won positions except for the
preference program, sue to enjoin administration of the program on
grounds of denial of their constitutional right to equal protection.
This may be recognized as Bakke in the employment field, posed
again to the Court after the Court's decisions in Bakke and Weber and
Fullilove. Like Bakke there was no claim that the program was a rem-
edy for past discrimination in the department. Absent such proof
would the affirmative action program pass muster? True, after Bakke
the Court upheld a program dealing with the black plus vs. white ten-
sion in Fullilove. But here there was still another tension-male vs.
female. Such a case came before the Court in the 1980 Term. Rather
than deal with these tensions, the Court "fenced out" the case, re-
turning it to the California courts.50 '
499. "That the program may press the outer limits of congressional authority affords no basis
for striking it down." 448 U.S. at 490 (Burger, C.J.). See text accompanying notes 155 & 157
,supra .
500. For example, the constitutionality of state-derived affirmative action for past societal dis-
crimination, or of judicial relief apart from a showing of past discrimination in the immediate
situation before the Court, or the extent to which reservation of places (using race as a factor) can
be justified even by past discrimination in the immediate unit under discussion.
501. Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 101 S. Ct. 2211 (1981). The Court was hardly
clear as to why it fenced out this case, settling for a combination of (a) the judgment appealed
from was not "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and (b) want of a properly presented
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If the Court had dealt with the merits, would it have stood by the
Powell opinion in Bakke, requiring that the state establish a compelling
state interest in the racial minority aspect?5" 2 And would it have stood
by the intermediate Craig v. Boren test to justify the program insofar as
it related to sex? Would these two conclusions not treat more favorably
affirmative action for women, than affirmative action for blacks, the
very group which Slaughter-House503 had recognized were the ones
specially favored by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment? With such doctrinal disarray, small wonder the Court ran
for cover. But when it does face this incongruity, as it must eventually,
how will the black minority fare? The Court, as Court, must reaffirm,
or reject, the promise of Slaughter-House. In Minnick,5" as in
DeFunis5 °5 in 1974, those Justices most favorable to the promises of
Slaughter-House and the spirit of reparation of the Brown era pressed
to "fence out" a decision on the merits. As Professor Tribe wrote about
Bakke,5°6 perhaps this was the best result proponents on the Court of
the spirit of Brown could hope for in the Spring of 1981.
Case B
Assume that a local municipal police or fire department has had a
notable resistance to hiring of racial minorities, both blacks and others,
and of women. An action brought by the aggrieved minorities and wo-
men leads a federal district court to prescribe a hiring plan that would
require the municipal department to fill vacancies for a 10-year period
on a basis of 50% open to all, and 50% divided between women and the
respective minorities in accordance with a formula like that set out in
Case A--the preference to last until the percentage of women and mi-
norities in the department corresponds to the percentages of women
and minorities in the state job pool.
The tensions of Case A are present here. However, the remedy
sought is judicial. The Burger Three in Fullilove5 0 7 suggested that judi-
cial power was less potent to remedy past discrimination with affirma-
tive action plans than was Congress'. This suggestion implies that the
affirmative action plan must be a remedy for past racial discrimination
in the specific police or fire department. If such past racial discrimina-
constitutional question, Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947). See text accompa-
nying note 387 supra.
502. See text accompanying notes 118-19 supra.
503. See text accompanying note 52 supra. But see Rostker v. Goldberg, !01 S. Ct. 2646
(1981).
504. Minnick v. California Dep't of Correction, 101 S. Ct. 2211 (1981).
505. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
506. See note 285 supra.
507. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980).
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tion is proved in the department, a remedy of proper modesty, as this
might well be, would seem to survive. On the other hand, if the reli-
ance is purely on past societal discrimination within the state at large,
the Fullilove warning may well be invoked to strike down the plan as
beyond judicial power. In this context the same disposition would
likely be made of the sex discrimination claim.50 8
Summary
In neither Case A nor Case B does the suggested analysis furnish a
firm basis for prediction of the Court's disposition. It does, however,
illuminate the factors on which the Court may act, or defer, or obscure.
And it accents unexplained inconsistencies and inconsideration in the
Court's dealing with the constitutional tensions: male vs. female com-
pared with black vs. white; and Court vs. Congress compared with
court vs. state. Perhaps most striking is the Court's almost total disre-
gard of the tension of present vs. future generations. Without constitu-
tional flexibility future generations will almost certainly be saddled
with precisely the inequalities of today. Without true constitutional re-
alism the mirage of "colorblindness" threatens to mock the promise of
equality under the law, that is, under a formulation of the law by which
equality is realistically possible.
D. Normativeness
In section A of this part, I suggested a form of analysis as descriptive
of how the constitutional process is actually conducted. One may agree
or disagree with the cogency of one or more elements so described.
The description is accurate or inaccurate. It is not right or wrong. In
sections B and C, I inquired whether, assuming the description was
accurate, it served to predict the outcome of constitutional litigation.
The analysis did seem to foreshadow decisional outcomes in the in-
stitutional conflicts embodied in section B largely, I believe, because it
made clear that contrary conclusions would substantially change the
long accepted presuppositions as to the basic functioning of the consti-
tutional system. Such basic changes are not impossible to effect. But
they require resort to the amending process.
On the other hand, the analysis had little, if any, predictive force in
the affirmative action situations examined in section C. Why should
this be? Is it not because that problem-with its complex of tensions,
some old, some new-does not challenge the historic mode of function-
ing of the constitutional system, but encompasses resolution of tensions
within that system? The analysis, without more, does not inevitably
508. See note 503 aspra.
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furnish the basis for predicting one resolution rather than another in
such a situation with complex competing tensions.
When we go beyond assessing the descriptive and predictive poten-
tial of the analysis and ask whether it is normative, we enter an area of
greater controversy. For in calling something-let us say X-norma-
tive we understand that X compels a given result in order for the
Court's decision to be "right" law. An explicit, precise provision of the
Constitution is clearly normative."° A congressional decision that
each state should have three senators, or a court decision approving it,
would obviously be "wrong," contrary to a specific normative provision
of the Constitution.510 In the series of cases from Marbury5I' through
Cooper v. Aaron,st 2 to United States v. Nixon 1 3 the Supreme Court
has, without successful constitutional challenge, asserted that its deci-
sions as to the meaning of constitutional provisions are normative, are
the "law of the land." The present inquiry goes beyond this and asks:
Can there be any X that may be considered normative of what the
Supreme Court should decide in a particular case beyond the demon-
strably clear and pertinent constitutional language situation discussed
above? To answer this affirmatively does not mean that if the Supreme
Court should decide something contrary to X its pronouncement would
not be "law."5 4 It does, however, suggest that its decision would not
be "right" law, and demonstrably so because of X. It would be law, but
"'wrong."
If we say that the suggested analysis in addition to being predictive
with respect to the human life bill and prayer amendments was also
normative, it must be because there is an "X" in the American constitu-
tional system which stipulates that any change in the basic functioning
of that system must be accomplished by constitutional amendment.
That assumption may be made within the framework of the suggested
analysis of the constitutional process.51
509. E.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVII: "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall
have one vote."
510. This is a crucial point. Cardozo grappled with it in terms of "right" and "power," in a
passage dealing with a common law judge that is applicable here: "Judges have, of course, the
power, though not the right, to ignore the mandate of a statute, and render judgment in despite
[sic] of it .... None the less, by that abuse of power, they violate the law." CARDOzo, supra note
286, at 129.
511. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
512. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958): "Mhe interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by
this Court ... is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding
effect on the States 'any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwith-
standing.'"
513. 418 U.S. 683 (1974): "We. . .reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court 'to
say what the law is'...." Id at 705.
514. See text accompanying notes 131-32 supra.
515. The key words here are "basic functioning." An obvious illustration is suggested by judi-
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Can we go a step further and suggest that there is also room for other
"X's" that would be normative to constitutional decision in less over-
powering situations, in the sense that they would furnish direction to
constitutional decisions that aspire to be "right" law? However difficult
this task, it can only be renounced if we are content to postulate that
the Supreme Court and its Justices are at large in their work in its most
significant area, and that there is no possibility of objectively "right"
constitutional decision. To open ourselves to this task leads, of course,
to an inquiry I have sidestepped to this point-the problem of justice in
American society.
V. THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
The discussion to date has outlined (1) what the Burger Court has
done in the constitutional area of equal protection,' 6 (2) what its indi-
vidual Justices have said in support of their differing conclusions in
equal protection,5" 7 (3) whether an acceptable account can be given
from the Supreme Court's practice of the nature of the constitutional
process,51 8 and (4) whether such an account is to any extent predic-
tive 519 or normative52° as well as descriptive. As to more obvious cases,
I have suggested that constitutional process may seem predictive,5 21 but
that in complex situations something more is needed to explain why a
decision goes this way rather than that.522 For want of a more precise
term we may call this missing piece a view of justice. What follows is
an inquiry as to this missing ingredient. What is this "justice"? Or
better, what is this justice in the specific context of the American consti-
tutional system? How does it relate to complex constitutional determi-
nations, particularly the aspects of equal protection which this article
has stressed? Is it either predictive or normative?
There are various techniques for avoiding completely any "legal"
discussion of the problem of justice. Judicial positivism has largely as-
signed it to politics or ethics, and thereby withdrawn it from law.
523
cial review. Not specifically provided for in the original Constitution, nor in any subsequent
amendment, it was identified by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803), and since continually maintained. It thus constitutes a "leading idea" that can hardly
be erased by simple legislation.
516. See text accompanying notes 1-165 supra.
517. See text accompanying notes 170-254 supra.
518. See text accompanying notes 286-398 supra.
519. See text accompanying notes 399-499 supra.
520. See text accompanying notes 509-514 supra.
521. See text accompanying notes 399-443 supra.
522. See text accompanying notes 444-508 supra.
523. In his formulation of a contemporary positivism, Professor H.L.A. Hart stands by what
he calls "the great battle cries of legal positivism: 'The existence of law is one thing; its merit or
demerit another.' [citing J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, Lecture V,
184-85 (1832)]: 'The law of a State is not an ideal but something which actually exists. . . it is not
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The influential jurisprudential thinkers known as American Realists5 24
have recognized that the notion of justice, apart from positive law, is a
factor in judicial decision, and a dominant one in the field of constitu-
tional law. 25 But they despair of defining it in any objective manner,
and affirm that different judges, like different people, have different in-
dividual views of the content of justice. They urge the "relatively
subordinate importance of rules." They insist that judges do "legislate"
in the process of deciding certain cases, and so they stress that one
should "learn the law by observing the conduct of judges." '26 In his
celebrated book, Cardozo rejected the abdication of the positivists as
contrary to judicial experience; he also rejected the give-it-up individu-
alism of the realists as contrary to his model of a proper (even constitu-
tional) judge.5 27  He agreed with the realists that the judge may
properly be said to be "legislating";5 28 but, he said, the judge strives to
apply an objective standard of justice. 29 Unfortunately, the criteria
that Cardozo offered for this objectivity were not sufficiently precise to
give guidance to those judges who were inclined to strive for objectiv-
ity.
3
In 1958, Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr., and Professor (later Dean)
Albert Sacks prepared an original and perceptive set of teaching mater-
that which ought to be but that which is.' [citing J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW
213 (1909)1; 'Legal norms may have any kind of content.' [citing H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY
OF LAW AND STATE 113 (1946)1." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 203 (1961). 'Hart sees the
proposition "that there is no necessary connexion between law and morals, or law as it is and law
as it ought to be" as a central thesis of judicial positivism with which he agrees.
He identifies "justice"-at least in the sense of treating like cases alike and different cases differ-
ently-as the aspect of morality most relevant to criticism of law. Id at 154-59. Hart adds that
"the criteria of relevant resemblances and differences may often vary with the fundamental moral
outlook of a given person or society." Id at 158. However, he makes two almost offhand com-
ments which identify the special problem we face in discussing justice and morality within the
context of the American constitutional system: (1) "In some systems, as in the United States, the
ultimate criteria of legal validity explicitly incorporate principles of justice or substantive moral
values . I..." d at 199. (2) "Judicial decision, especially on matters of high constitutional im-
port, often involves a choice between moral values, and not merely the application of some single
outstanding moral principle. ... Id at 200. Our inquiry here fits comfortably within Hart's
attenuated positivism. How is this choice to be made, given the principles ofjustice already incor-
porated among the constitutional ideas, tensions, and process?
524. For a critical study of these jurists (Gray, Holmes, Frank, Llewellyn, and others), see
Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934). See also J. FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 264-84 (1930); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING AP-
PEALS- 508-12 (1960); LLEWELLYN, A Realistic Juriprudence--The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431 (1930); Llewellyn, Some Realism About realism--Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 1222 (1931).
525. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 367, 371 (1959).
526. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 132, 284 (1930).
527. CARDOZO, supra note 286, at 136, 171.
528. Id at 115.
529. Id at 106, 121.
530. Id at 112-13, 141, 170.
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ials for a course at Harvard Law School in "The Legal Process."53
They stressed principles and policies of the Constitution, major legisla-
tion, and long-standing significant judicial decisions, as starting points
for judicial reasoning."' So viewed, these afforded objective data for
elaborations of the idea of justice in American society. A decade later,
sociological studies on the nature of social institutions led Professor
Charles Black to suggest that objective decisional content could be de-
rived from constitutional structures, such as the nation-state relation-
ship and the tripartite division of powers provided by the federal
Constitution.533 In the 1970's Professor John Rawls, a moral philoso-
pher, published a full scale analysis of the idea of justice,5 34 with atten-
tion to American constitutional concerns, and an American lawyer in
Blackstone's chair at Oxford, Professor Ronald Dworkin, focused new
attention upon the normative content of "rights. ' 535 Despite these ef-
forts to foster a basis for objective decision according to justice, two
,generations of American judges since Cardozo have accepted, for the
most part, the invitation of the realists to decide in the "gaps" accord-
ing to their individual lights. Is this the best that can be done? I think
not.
To focus the quest for an objective basis of justice or "right" law in
constitutional decisionmaking, consider the more extreme positivists'
531. H.M. Hart, Jr. & Albert Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law (tentative ed. 1958).
532. Id at 158-60. See also id at 101-02 (discussing Cardozo with respect to conflicting prin-
ciples in private law).
A linguistic problem lurks in discussion of "principles" and "policies." Hart and Sacks identify
a "policy" as "simply a statement of objective. E.g. full employment, the promotion of the prac-
tice and procedure of collective bargaining .... etc., etc., etc." A "principle," to Hart and Sacks,
differs from a "policy" in that beyond stating a result it "asserts that the result ought to be
achieved and includes, either expressly or by reference to well understood bodies of thought, a
statement of the reasons why it should be achieved. E.g.pacta sunt servanda-agreements should
be observed; no person should be unjustly enriched; etc., etc." But both "[p]rinciples and policies,
like rules and standards, are general directive propositions" of the particular legal system. They
are the basic "guides to the exercise of a trained and responsible discretion... the basic devices
for controlling as well as may be the most important and the more intractable of the decisions
which the circumstances of man in society require to be postponed to the future." Id at 159-60.
But Professor Ronald Dworkin defines principles and policies significantly otherwise. In his
latest formulation he writes:
Arguments of principle attempt to justify a political decision that benefits some person or
group by showing that the person or group has a right to the benefit. Arguments of policy
attempt to justify a decision by showing that, in spite of the fact that those who are benefited
do not have a right to the benefit, providing the benefit will advance a collective goal of the
political community.
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 294 (1978). This distinction is at the core of Dworkin's
"rights thesis." See note 592 infira.
533. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (1969).
534. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
535. R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). An entire issue of the Georgia Law
Review was given over to critiques of Dworkin's "rights thesis" by several scholars, including
H.L.A. Hart, and Dworkin's rebuttal. Jurisprudence Symposium, II GA. L. REV. 969 (1977).
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solution again. Their view is that "justice" is known only as it is con-
tained in positive law.5 36 The realists assume that judges often are
making, not merely declaring, law,5 37 and that they are generally influ-
enced by a personal concept of policy, or justice. 38 Many realists as-
sume that this personal concept of policy is, like a legislator's, rooted in
the utilitarian creed of the greatest good for the greatest numberi 39 It
is difficult to apply an unalloyed brand of utilitarianism in constitu-
tional law, because of the specific identification in the Constitution of a
variety of individual rights entitled to protection against the states and
the national government. 5"
I make certain easily conceded assumptions. The starting point of
our inquiry is at what Holmes54 ' and Cardozo 542 called "gaps" in con-
stitutional law. Where the constitutional language is clear, where the
legislative history is compelling, or where there is clear and satisfactory
precedent, one finds the system's answer of "justice" in the law itself.
On this all seem to agree. But where there is less than clarity in these
elements the judge, like a legislator, must make a choice. We have
examined an array of factors a constitutional judge considers. But
these factors are often not, without more, sufficient to compel a judicial
choice. For example, should a particular period of constitutional de-
velopment be arrested, and another direction taken? In such a case, or
when the judge seeks, without compelling history or precedent, to de-
fine "equality" in a specific situation, what factors of justice can he call
on to help him make the "right" or "just" decision?
536. This view would rule out the present inquiry as beyond the proper scope of law in con-
trast to more moderate positivism of H.L.A. Hart. But see note 523 supra.
537. Others, not themselves realists, also take this position-Cardozo, for example. See note
287 supra.
538. Ronald Dworkin suggests a principal concern of American jurisprudence: "How do
courts decide difficult or controversial lawsuits?" The question was largely ignored by English
legal theory, at least before H.L.A. Hart. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 3 (1978).
Dworkin then suggests that the American realists' mission was to unveil that "judges actually
decide cases according to their own political or moral tastes, and then choose an appropriate legal
rule as a rationalization," as contrasted with "the orthodox doctrine that judges merely apply
existing rules." Id.
539. For an interesting discussion of various forms of utilitarianism in a constitutional context
of equal protection, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 538, at 231-39.
540. This is a main point of Dworkin's and explains his pleasure at Rawls' A THEORY OF
JUSTICE. Using a form of social contract theory, Rawls rejected utilitarianism in its most promi-
nent forms as an inadequate basis for a theory of justice. J. RAWLS, supra note 534, at 183-92.
541. "1 recognize without hesitation that judges must and do legislate, but they do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions." Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 211 (1917).
542. CARDOZO, supra note 286, at 69, 113, 125.
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A. Rights
Take the question of rights, so stressed by Professor Dworkin.5 43 If a
plaintiff asserts a right that is safeguarded by a specific provision of the
Constitution, that may end the inquiry. But perhaps not. There may
be a conflict with a different constitutional right asserted by the defend-
ant. Consider the recent conflict between a newspaper's first amend-
ment right to report on a trial and a defendant's right to a fair trial.5 "
Or, the question before the Court may involve the arguable outer rim
of a right that is itself clearly established. The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the right to appointed counsel by an indigent defendant in a
criminal case. 45 This past Term the Court rejected the claim that this
right is broad enough to require appointed counsel in a civil case when
a court cuts off the parental rights of an indigent parent. 546 On what
does the Court draw in making its determination that the right did not
extend this extra inch? Even when there is no conflict with another
right, a specific, conceded, right may not be granted when other impor-
tant elements are present which significantly affect the whole society-
for example, national security,547 or public order,54 8 or morality, 549 or
the proper functioning of the criminal justice system.550 In considering
these other elements the Court is drawing on the concept of justice to
curtail specific rights.
B. Equality
Now consider the notion of equality, which in most formulations is
placed at the core of an idea of justice. 55 ' Equality made its explicit
entrance into the American constitutional system only in 1868, with the
guaranty by the fourteenth amendment of equal protection of the
543. See note 535 supra.
544. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
545. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
546. Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981).
547. This was the underlying premise of the Court's decision in Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951).
548. This concern was stressed in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
101 S. Ct. 2559, 2566 (1981), as a basis for limiting first amendment rights.
549. This was the underlying premise of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
550. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See text accompanying note 371 supra.
551. Professor Carl Friedrich finds that "Aristotle's doctrine concerning the relation ofjustice
to equality" is "basic to all thought concerning the problem ofjustice and law." C. FRIEDRICH,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 192 (1958).
Central for his point of view is the proposition that the just must be understood in the sense
of the equal. But Aristotle draws the decisive distinction between numerical and proportional
equality. Numerical equality equates each man as a unit with each other man. It is what we
now ordinarily understand by equality and what we mean when we say that all citizens are
equal before the law.
Id at 21.
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laws." 2 As the Supreme Court noted in the Slaughter-House Cases, 553
this provision was directly pointed to racial discrimination against the
new black citizens. The constitutional question of equality usually
comes before the Court by a plaintiff's challenge to legislative or execu-
tive action that gives social benefits or burdens to some that are not
accorded to others. The Court's basic test of the abridgment of consti-
tutional equality (aside from the set of extraordinary cases) 554 has been
simply whether the legislature had a rational basis for its legislated ine-
quality. Neither equality, nor equal protection, is assured by the Con-
stitution, said the Court, when a legislature could reasonably make the
challenged classification.55 What considerations of justice led the
Court to this attenuation of equality? Then came the Warren Court
exceptions to this restrictive view of equality: a state must show a
much stronger reason-a compelling state interest-to justify a denial
of equality on the basis of race.5 56 What basis in justice led the Court
to make this differentiation? The reason ultimately given for this ex-
panded equality for black citizens was not a mere notion of justice, but
the historical facts that had been cited in Slaughter-House,557 and the
outrageous denial of constitutional equality to blacks that the Supreme
Court itself had sponsored from Plessy v. Ferguson558 in 1896 to Brown
v. Board of Education559 in 1954. Although there is not one line about
injustice or constitutional morality in Brown itself,5 60 the Court soon
acknowledged that in using extraordinary remedies, often disadvanta-
geous to non-black citizens in the school cases, it was engaged in a
traditional judicial exercise of remedial justice, repairing the equality
damaged by past injustice.56'
552. See notes 319 supra & 585 infra.
553. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See text accompanying note 52 supra.
554. Discussed at text accompanying notes 35, 42-45 supra.
555. Hence, the rational basis test, so deferential to legislative judgment. See text accompany-
ing note 32 supra.
556. See cases cited in note 35 supra.
557. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
558. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
559. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
560. In discussing the "separate but equal" doctrine in Brown the Supreme Court declined to
face squarely its change of direction as being impelled by convictions of justice and injustice. It
squirmed to find "psychological facts" which established that "separate" public education of black
children was in fact "unequal." Id at 494 n.4.
561. From the outset, the extraordinary judicial remedies employed in the school cases follow-
ing Brown, constituted use of the traditional powers of an equity court to remedy past injustices,
or, as the Court put it in Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971), "to
correct past constitutional violations."
A friendly critic made the following comment on this section on equality: "Equality? Is this
clear? Is there not room to argue that both Alan Bakke and the blacks admitted [under the prefer-
ential admissions program in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, see text accompanying notes
448-72 supra] were asserting an interest in equality-Bakke to be treated like all applicants, and
the black students to be admitted on a basis that did not carry forward prior discrimination
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C. Remedial Justice
Remedial justice is not entirely the work of the courts. But when
state and federal legislative and administrative bodies sponsored their
own forms of remedial justice in affirmative action plans, and these
forms were challenged, the Court asked itself: What constitutional
guideposts can furnish our solution here? Legislative preference? Pop-
ular preference? Individualized judicial notions of justice? Why not
an objective idea of justice that can be drawn from the American con-
stitutional experience?
On what objective notion of justice did the Court draw in fashioning
its determination in Washington v. Davis,562 and its successor cases,
that the constitutional denial of equal protection by a state or national
government must be proved to be intentional? Neither these decisions,
nor Bakke," were impelled by text, or established policy, or clear pre-
cedent. At most these were classic instances of the Court at the cross-
roads, legislating within "gaps." Was the Court at large? Or was there
at hand an objective notion of justice to guide its decision in either
Davis or Bakke?
D. Leading Ideas
With these three traditional elements in hand-rights, equality, and
remedial justice-each adapted to the unique requirements of the
American constitutional system--a stab at an objective formulation of
justice can be made. But something is still missing. It concerns what I
called earlier the leading or fundamental ideas of the American consti-
tutional system, something akin to what Hart and Sacks referred to as
principles and policies.5 65 Some of these appear in the constitutional
language,566 others have evolved by major judicial decision.567 Can
some order, or priority, emerge among these leading ideas? One does
not require a rigid hierarchy among them to say that some fundamental
ideas are more important than others. Since the constitutional lan-
guage does not establish such a pecking order, it must derive from
other sources. Ultimately, it must be pronounced explicitly, or acted on
against the class of which they were members? Am I really asking 'equality' in reference to
what?" The point is well taken, and my suggestion is that the critical point of reference is found in
the society's "leading ideas." See section D. infra.
562. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
563. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
564. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
565. See notes 531-32 supra.
.566. The equal protection clause is an example. See notes 318 & 523 supra.
567. The classic example is the pronouncement of the doctrine of judicial review in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), and its continued reiteration and acceptance.
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implicitly, by the Supreme Court as the ultimate interpreter of the Con-
stitution. 68 An example is the recent recognition by the Court of a
peculiar prominence of the first amendment. Some Justices had
frankly called for a "preferred position. '5 69  Although this particular
explicit formulation did not survive, one need only recall the Pentagon
Papers Case5 70 to be reassured that the first amendment does rank un-
usually high among the leading fundamental ideas.57" '
Similarly, one could fairly expect that the idea of equality-adopted
in the Constitution 572 after generations of racial oppression, 573 after a
bitter internal war to erase this racial oppression, and after constitu-
tional amendments 574 to prevent carry-over of its vestiges to the "new"
nation-would rank high among the leading ideas.5 75  The failure of
the Supreme Court to recognize this in the last quarter of the 19th cen-
tury and the first half of the present century, gave new urgency to this
568. This is not the only way a written constitution can operate. France and Switzerland have
no comparable judicial review. But it is the basic theory of American constitutional law, accepted
since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). See text accompanying notes 293, 363 &
515 supra.
569. The source of this short-lived view was Justice Stone's influential footnote in United
States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938), discussed in notes 34 & 107 supra. See
also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88, 90 (1949); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600 (1942);
Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). However, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out in
his concurring opinion in Kovacs, the doctrine never commanded a majority position on the
Court. 336 U.S. at 94-95.
570. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
571. See text accompanying notes 345-55 supra.
572. In the fourteenth amendment in 1868. See note 54 supra.
The same friendly critic cited in note 561 supra responded to this note and the accompanying
text: "I guess I'm not sure equality was, or is, adopted in the Constitution." The distinction must
be made between the adoption of the idea or goal of equality-which the fourteenth amendment
certainly did-and the fulfillment of that idea of equality-which clearly remains unrealized. The
suggestion here is that equality, as an adopted idea is a valid and necessary guide to constitutional
decisionmaking, a core element of constitutional morality in our legal system. In his interesting
study, Racism, Sexism and Preferential Treatment. An Approach to the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 581 (1977), Professor Richard Wasserstrom distinguishes "the way the culture is" from the
perspective of "the way things ought to be." And he suggests a third perspective focusing on the
question: "What is the best or most appropriate way to move from the existing social realities
[racism, sexism, etc.]. . to a closer approximation of the ideal society." I am proposing that the
idea of equality-in-face-of-racism is not simply a valid moral or ethical ideal, but that it has actu-
ally been adopted (as an "idea" to be sure), and is a present part of our constitutional materials,
crying out to be realized.
573. See text accompanying notes 52, 69 & 71 supra.
574. See notes 54, 61 & 319 supra.
575. Consider the implications of Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In this companion
case to Brown, the Supreme Court ruled that equal protection of the laws was an ingredient of the
fifth amendment's due process clause, and as such was applicable to the federal government and
its instrumentalities (public schools in the District of Columbia). The implication of this ruling, to
which the Court has consistently adhered, is that the guaranty of equal protection has been in the
Constitution from 1791, and that the fourteenth amendment merely applied it to the states. Its
specification in the fourteenth amendment, rather than again being subsumed in a "due process"
clause, accents the special racial significance given equal protection in Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See text accompanying notes 52 & 54 supra.
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idea of practical racial equality. Undertaking the too long-deferred
task to build an America in which divisions-personal, social, political,
and economic-would eventually foreswear race as a principle of clas-
sification was the great contribution of the Warren Court. One might
call it a heritage which its successors hold in trust.
5 7 6
E. Constitutional Justice and the Burger Court
Why has the Burger Court been troubled with this heritage? We
have seen some of the reasons: complications presented by the more
visible presence of minorities other than blacks; S 7 popular resistance to
the economic effects of affirmative action;5 78 a lingering, if somewhat
muted racism;5 79 the Court's reluctance to seriously disadvantage ma-
jority whites in the course of fulfilling remedial justice to blacks;580 and
the emergence of the newly perceived thrust of equality for women.
581
These are real considerations, although some of them are obviously un-
worthy. If the objections be faced squarely, do they fairly displace
equality-in-face-of-racism as a leading constitutional idea? It is this is-
sue that needs to be addressed frankly by the Court-as an aspect con-
stitutional morality, or constitutional justice. The question of what
kind of society we are to become requires a different quality of atten-
tion than the Court has given it. First, it must respect as authoritative,
the leading ideas to which the society has committed itself but not yet
realized. Second, it must address the realities that stand in the way of
realizing such an elusive idea as equality-in-face-of-racism now and in
the future. For, the Court's mission is to interpret a Constitution in
face of future as well as present generations. The Court must directly
answer the question and not circumvent it with cant such as present
"colorblindness, ' 582 and the requirement of proof-beyond-reach of in-
tentional discrimination to make out a constitutional violation. 3
Constitutional morality requires a conception of justice. This should
be not the sum total of conceptions of individual Justices, but one that
576. See Broderick, PreferentialAdmirsions and the Brown Heritage, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 124,
172 (1977).
577. See text accompanying notes 310, 340 & 449 supra.
578. See text accompanying note 476 supra.
579. This consideration has been acknowledged in recent Supreme Court opinions. See text
accompanying notes 69, 71, & 180-81 supra.
580. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
581. By adding women to blacks (and other racial minorities) as classes which are candidates
for remedial affirmative action for past discrimination, the degree of disadvantage to white males
is increased.
582. The Court has been urged, and obviously was tempted, to a premature invocation of
"colorblindness." See text accompanying notes 182 & 469 supra. But so far it has wisely ab-
stained from doing so.
583. See note 54 supra.
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has been fairly proclaimed by the constitutional society. It is central to
such a concept of constitutional justice that its leading ideas are ulti-
mately pronounced in operative form not by poll or vote, not by legis-
lature or executive (although these have a contribution to make), but
by the constitutional judge-subject only to correction by constitu-
tional amendment. 84
President Calvin Coolidge is credited with observing, "The business
of the country is business." The business of constitutional law is consti-
tutional justice. In our system, to date, pronouncement of these conclu-
sions of justice has been the business of the Supreme Court. The
responsibility of that Court, sometimes fulfilled, sometimes not, is to
execute its task with a searching eye for an objective constitutional mo-
rality.
EPILOG
Beyond its initial rapportage on the work of the Burger Court in
equal protection, this article is work in progress. I raise an old ques-
tion: 8  Are there arguably objective criteria by which the Court can
measure its responsibility and its work where constitutional language
gives no clear answer? To answer, "Do justice" or "Enforce rights,"
obviously only restates the need for specifications and clarity as to the
hallmarks of "justice" or "rights" in the American constitutional sys-
tem.586 There may be limits to the degree of specification that is avail-
able. But lack of clarity is inexcusable.
How much specification may be expected in the search for constitu-
tional morality5 87 in the American system? Here is the proper area for
further research and debate. The tentative answer of this paper-
rooted in its suggestions of tensions and leading ideas-is: far more
than is presently given, and probably less than some would prefer.
584. There is obviously misunderstanding and insensitivity, even at the highest levels ofgover-
ment, of the range of responsibility of a constitutional Justice. On the occasion of Justice Stew-
art's announced plan to retire, the White House spokesman reiterated a frequently stated position
of the President. As reported in the New York Times, June 19, 1981, at 6, col. i, "Today, Larry
Speakes, the deputy White House press secretary, said that Mr. Reagan would nominate someone
who shared with the President 'one key view: the role of the courts is to interpret the law, not to
enact new law by judicial fiat.'"
The same news report recalled: "Mr. Reagan has been highly critical of recent Supreme Court
decisions. At a news conference early last year he said that the public 'had seen the Supreme
Court override public opinion' on such issues as school prayer, school desegregation and the treat-
ment of criminals. Each time, he said, 'Our great respect for the Court shielded those Justices who
put themselves above the law.'" Id
585. The question was pressed a generation ago in a frequently cited, if largely unproductive,
article, Wechsler, Toward Neutral Princiles of Constitutional Law, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959).
586. See A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE (1959). "[T]o invoke justice is the same thing as
banging on the table." Id at 274.
587. See text accompanying notes 296 supra & 590 ifra.
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As to clarity, the first step is to recognize that the responsibility of the
Supreme Court in the American constitutional system does not depend
upon a general theory of law such as H.L.A. Hart and Dworkin have
been disputing with great profit to all.588 Even positivists recognize
that constitutional clauses such as "due process" and "equal protec-
tion" have moral content.589 The crucial task is to identify the criteria
our constitutional system recognizes and accepts for fixing the content
of constitutional law.59° I have argued that these criteria (or "rules of
recognition") may take account of explicit leading ideas and tensions,
or those which have evolved in our 200 years of constitutional history.
These suggestions are skeletal. Further work is necessary on the opera-
tive effect of tensions and the method of identifying the leading ideas,
but the task is not as impossible as Dworkin suggests. 591  Dworkin
makes an important contribution in arguing (against a utilitarian tilt)
for a primacy of individual rights.5 92 But he offers little clarity in re-
spect of criteria for permissible limitation of these rights, or for dealing
with a conflict of rights. It may be that no sharp criteria are often avail-
able. But Dworkin insists nonetheless that each case has "one right
answer" which a proper judge should identify. 593 The problem, I be-
lieve, is that he wants to solve constitutional problems with a theory of
general law. Once we recognize that the American constitutional sys-
tem assigns a limited political choice (theory of tensions) 594 to the
Supreme Court, the need for one right answer dissolves. Even at the
same moment in history different views, say as to federalism or separa-
tion of powers, would be within constitutional "rightness" markers.
The second point as to clarity is that there is no excuse for obfusca-
588. See text accompanying notes 523 & 535-40 supra.
589. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 199 (1961). See note 523 supra.
590. This statement accepts, provisionally, Hart's "rule of recognition" analysis. See text ac-
companying note 399 supra. I have referred to this total task as realization of constitutional mo-
rality. See text accompanying note 296 supra. Interestingly, Dworkin at one point identifies
"constitutional morality" as "the justification that must be given for its constitution as interpreted
by its judges." R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 126 (1978). But he still denies Hart's
"rule of recognition" thesis. Id at 59-60.
591. R. DWORKIN, supra note 590, at 28-31, 64-68. I am assuming that Dworkin would raise
the same objections against "leading ideas" that he makes as to principles.
592. In a choice chapter, Dworkin uses his "rights thesis" against utilitarian arguments to
justify affirmative action against a "reverse discrimination" challenge. Id at 223-39. Briefly,
Dworkin's "rights thesis" proposes that "judicial decisions in civil cases ... characteristically are
and should be generated by principle not policy." Id at 84. For Dworkin's special definitions of
"principles" and "policy," see note 532 supra.
593. R. DWORKIN, supra note 590, at 279-90, 331-38.
594. See text accompanying notes 299-344 supra. As restrained a jurist as Justice Jackson
supports this view R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERN-
MENT 53-83 (1955). The theory of tensions proposed here does not foreclose the possibility that
the government vs. individual (or group) tension should be, as Dworkin suggests, heavily tilted to
individual and group rights.
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tion, arcaneness, or dissimulation in constitutional law. 95 The
Supreme Court makes choices in its decisions that affect the basic con-
cerns of the people of the United States. The minimum requirement is
that the Justices understand and express clearly and openly the criteria
used in their decisions. Cardozo wrote in language the public can un-
derstand. 96 So did Jerome Frank.597 To a remarkable degree so does
H.L.A. Hart.5 98 But all these purported to be writing on general law.
There is a present demand for authoritative writing in general constitu-
tional law that is comprehensible to non-professionals. There is no
want of think pieces by constitutional lawyers in the law reviews, trig-
gered by concern with particular decisions of the Court.599 Such spe-
cial pleading articles have drawn out some thoughtful responses.6
But this literature, such as it is, deals only with fragments of constitu-
tional law. Furthermore, these fragments are pointed to professionals,
even to specialists among professionals.60 t The crucial constitutional
overviews are left to theorists of general law.602 The public is left
595. A proper emphasis on clarity for public consumption would undoubtedly purge, for ex-
ample, such nuances as Dworkin's suggestion that a judge should either lie, or resign, when the
answer he finds in authoritative legal materials is contrary to "strong" reasons supplied by "back-
ground moral rights." In such case, says Dworkin, the judge may have "a moral duty to do what
he can to support these rights." But Dworkin insists, somewhat mysteriously, that he would not
"make this lie a matter of jurisprudential theory." R. DWORKIN, supra note 590 at 327.
596. See B. CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). See also text accom-
panying notes 286-89, 294-96 & 365.-68 supra.
597. See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930), passim; J. FRANK, COURTS ON
TRIAL (1959),passimt See also notes 524-26 supra.
598. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961),passim See also note 523 supra.
599. The following recent "jurisprudential" articles on constitutional law are illustrations of
this point, being in whole or large part responses to the Supreme Court's perceived excess in its
1973 abortion decision: Ely, "The Wages ofCrying Wol. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973) (but compare his later articles cited in the next note); Monaghan, The Supreme
Court 1974 Term-Foreword" Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975) (to which
compare Schrock and Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1117 (1978)); and Monaghan, Of"Liberty and "Property", 62 CORNELL L.J. 405 (1977). A compa-
rable volley of legal literature followed upon the controversial race, criminal justice, and reappor-
tionment decisions of the Warren Court, and the affirmative action issues presented to the Burger
Court.
600. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980);
Ely, Foreword- On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978); Ely, Constitu-
tional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978); Grey, Origins of the
Unwritten Constitution.- Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV.
843 (1978); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
601. The debate recounted in notes 599-600 has produced new and unhelpful jargon for which
there is neither need nor previous authority: (1) the suggestion of a "constitutional common law"
in which Congress may override all but core policies underlying constitutional decisions of the
Court, see Monaghan, and Schrock and Welsh supra note 597, and (2) suggestions of "interpreta-
tive" review, somewhat allied to the concept of "constitutional common law," which would limit
the authority of the Supreme Court to enforcing express or clearly implicit (whatever that means
in the context of "due process" and "equal protection") language of the Constitution. The authors
cited do not agree on what "noninterpretative" means, except that the Supreme Court has more
authority than the "interpretative" theory would allow it.
602. While Hart mentions it only in passing, see note 523 supra, Dworkin is obviously at home
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outside, with little to "look in" at.
An original American legal realist,603 Justice Douglas, after thirty-six
years on the Court, wrote these words defensively rather than critically:
"The truck drivers and field hands of the nation cannot be expected to
understand subtle constitutional nuances. ' '6°4 It is high time that con-
stitutional law, which governs their lives, be written so they can.
with American constitutional law. But he does not undertake a special constitutional theory, opt-
ing for a general theory of law.
603. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism--Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv.
1222, 1257 (1931).
604. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 278 n.18 (1980).
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